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1. Background 
The Commission intends to make a proposal for a long-term management plan for the anchovy based 
on the following objectives: 
1.  to ensure the exploitation of the stock at high yields consistent with maximum sustainable 
yield; 
2. to guarantee the stability of the fishery, as far as possible, and with a low risk of stock 
collapse. 
In 1999, the Commission entrusted STECF to produce an extended risk analysis showing, under 
different multi-annual management strategies, the consequences on the sustainability of the resource 
expressed in terms of risk of collapse and on the total annual yield. The evaluations included a test of 
robustness to a wide range of choices in the underlying biological parameters such as stock-
recruitment relationships and fleet harvest behaviour models to simulate different responses of the fleet 
to resource availability. 
In November 2007, the Commission has produced non-paper gathering different elements that should 
be considered and discussed with Member States, the scientific community and the SWW RAC. These 
should be thoroughly analysed before they are incorporate into the long-term plan. 
Accordingly, two STECF Working Groups were convened, one in Hamburg from 14-18 April in 
parallel to the STECF/PLEN-08-01 meeting and a second in Pasajes from 2-6 June 2008. Both of these 
meetings addressed the following terms of reference.  
 
2. Subgroup Assumptions 
The working group evaluated the impact of three different harvest control rules (HCR) by simulation, 
regarding the sustainability of the stock, catches, economic balance and social impact.  
Three different HCR were simulated. The first rule (Rule A) is based on catching a constant proportion 
(γ values) above an escapement Biomass (SSB) level. The second rule (Rule B) is based on catching a 
constant proportion (γ values) of the SSB. Thirdly a rule (Rule C) based on a constant short-term risk 
of 15% for low recruitment. 
The performance of each rule was tested for γ values between 0 and 1 by steps of 0.1. 
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For each of the strategies outlined, the HCR with and without a ceiling equal to 33,000 tonnes, (the 
historically fixed level of TAC set to this fishery) and, with and without a minimum TAC as 
corresponding to the smallest catch that allows the fishery to remain economically viable (at 7,000 
tonnes, as pointed out by the SWW RAC), were constructed. 
In the fishery model, the simulation was performed using two operating models: an age-structured and 
a two-stage biomass fishery model. 
The model was conditioned on the results from the stock assessment corresponding to ICES advice 
2007. An age-structured model used for verification, is based on a seasonal multi-fleet integrated catch 
at age assessment as the one used in ICES 2005. This model was updated up to 2007 in order to 
provide starting conditions for the current simulations. 
Catches were allocated to countries on a half-year basis. The allocation was based on the mean fraction 
of the catch taken by each Country during the period 1992-2004 (constant allocation). However, some 
other possible allocations were tested, 90% (Sp)-10% (Fr) to 60% (Sp)-40% (Fr). Furthermore a likely 
projection of the allocation of catches to countries is the draft under discussion at the pelagic 
committee of the Southern RAC (variable allocation relative to the TAC level).  
The socio-economic impact was evaluated by means of algorithms developed during the meeting. It 
performs a stochastic socio-economic analysis considering the biological outcome as an input. It is 
based on estimations of production functions for anchovy by semester and by fleet, considering the 
SSB of anchovy, the number of vessels in the fishery of anchovy and the time devoted to it. A 
production function for the rest of target species was also estimated, in this case without considering 
any SSB.  
A price function for anchovy, based on French and Spanish data is also estimated. Price for other 
species was considered as fixed. 
The economic model was conditioned on the data provided by IEO & AZTI`s CAFE Project database 
(EU contract no 022644) for the Spanish fleets was used, and DPMA-IFREMER data for the French 
fleets. The time series goes from 2000-2005, and 2000-2006, respectively. 
The indicators presented are: 
• Biological risk measured in terms of number of the likelihood of SSB being below Blim  
• The number of years in which the fishery should be closed. 
• The total expected match of anchovy. 
• The variation of this catch. 
• The Gross revenue obtained from anchovy (discounted 5%) for each fleet. 
• Gross Cash Flow (discounted 5%) for each fleet. 
• Economic risk as the likelihood of having a negative cash flow. 
• A social indicator as the relative wage to the average of the country by FTE.  
The report presents tables including the values obtained for all these indicators as well as a summary 
of the main findings and limitations. Tables showing the results of the various harvest strategies 
investigated are given in Tables 3.1.1.1 , 3.1.1.2, 3.1.1.2.1, 3.1.1.2.2, 3.1.3.1 of the SGBRE-08-01 
Working Group report.. 
 
3. STECF Comments and Conclusions 
STECF endorses the approach and findings presented in the report of the SGBRE-08-01 Working 
groups and draws the following conclusions: 
 
1. The higher the exploitation rate the higher the catch, its variability, the associated biological 
risk and the discounted gross revenue.  
2. The overall discounted cash flow is maximized for low harvest rates but this may be a 
consequence of the “optimistic” expected availability of other species and the assumption of a 
constant price. This could be also the reason for the relative low sensitivity to the allocation 
between member states.  
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3. Setting a maximum TAC of 33.000 tonnes reduces maximum attainable catch and decreases 
inter-annual variability in TACs and also reduces the associated biological risks. Furthermore, 
the economic risk is lower when a maximum is set. 
4. Setting a minimum TAC of 7.000 tonnes does not alter mean catch or associated biological risk 
but increases the probability of closures. 
5. For equivalent levels of biological risk, expected catches are higher for the options where there 
is no upper TAC constraint. 
6. Both rules A & B imply similar biological risk at equal mean annual catch. However, Rule B 
may result in more stability in TACs. 
7. The social indicator reflects the relationship between the average wage of the member state and 
those obtained by the fleets. STECF stresses that this indicator social only takes into 
consideration employment of on-board crew and in fact, only reflects the social consequences 
of a scenario that assumes a constant number of vessels.  
8. The anchovy processing industry is asking for a well-supplied market (high TAC) and low 
prices. In that sense low TACs create a risk to the fleets of loosing their buyers. But high TACs 
also increase the risk of closing the fishery, and discontinuity in the supply could also result in 
the processing industry turning to other markets. The latter effect therefore provides a driver 
for TACs that give a low probability of closure. A survey to estimate recruitment strength takes 
place every autumn. If it can be demonstrated that the survey provides a reliable index of 
incoming recruitment, HCRs that make use of the index could be developed. A further 
evaluation process, which would include simulation testing, would then be required. 
9. Results are insensitive to the choice of either the Ricker or the Quadratic Hockey stick stock 
and recruitment models. However, the results are highly sensitive to persistent low recruitment. 
Under such a scenario, the average catch would be less than 10,000 t while the associated 
biological risk will be higher than 10% for all HCRs investigated.  
10. The economic data collected under the current DCR (even if it had been available), is not 
appropriate for conditioning the model used. 
The model assumption that the total TAC will always be caught is probably unrealistic. It would be 
more appropriate to take into account the economic incentives for vessels to re-allocate effort between 
species. However, to solve this, a full feedback bio-economic model, which takes into account the 
economic behaviour of vessels and the biological consequences, is required. STECF notes that at 
present, such a model is unavailable. 
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1. Introduction 
The Commission intends to make a proposal for a long-term management plan for the anchovy. Two 
meetings took place in 2008 to provide the necessary scientific basis for a long-term management plan 
proposal for anchovy. The first meeting took place from 14-18 April in Hamburg and reported to 
STECF Spring plenary (Report STECF/SGBRE 0801). The group performed a thorough evaluation of 
two basic harvest control rules (HCR) and set the basis for an economic evaluation. Given paucity of 
data and shortage of time the economic evaluation performed was considered preliminary.  
 
A second STECF group met in San Sebastian, Spain from 2 – 6 June, 2008. The group was tasked with 
the terms of reference (ToRs) outlined in the following section. 
 
1.1. Statement of the Problem  
1.1.1. The Anchovy stock in the Bay of Biscay 
Anchovy (Engraulis encrasicholus) of the Bay of Biscay is a short-lived pelagic fish. The fishery is 
very important for both Spain and France. The stock experiences large inter-annual fluctuations in 
abundance caused mainly by variations in recruitment, driven by environmental factors. Recruitment 
has been very low since 2001. In particular, recruitment of the 2004 year class was classified as a 
failure. This has resulted in a decline of the stock and led to the closure of the fishery in the second 
half of 2005 and 2006. Since then the fishery has remained closed.  
 
A more detailed description of the anchovy stock and the fishery was provided in the 1st STECF 
anchovy meeting (Report STECF/SGBRE 0801). 
1.1.2. Reference points for management 
Current biological reference points for the Bay of Biscay anchovy were defined by ICES ACFM in 
October 2003 as follows: 
 
Table 1.1.1 Reference points for management 
 Type Value Technical basis 
Blim 21 000 t Blim: Bloss = 21 000 t (1989 SSB) 
Bpa 33 000 t Bpa = Bloss x exp(1.645σ) 
Flim - Not defined. 
Precautionary 
approach 
Fpa 1.0–1.2     Fpa: = F for 50% spawning potential ratio, i.e. the F at which the 
SSB/R is half of what it would have been in the absence of fishing. 
Targets Fy - Not defined. 
(unchanged since 2003) 
 
 
1.1.3. Management Objectives 
There are no explicit agreed management objectives for this stock.  
The present closure of the fishery aims at protecting the remaining stock until a strong year class 
recruits to the stock. The repeated recommendation of closures given by STECF since 2005 has 
implied in practice not allowing any catches until full recovery above Bpa is achieved.  
The terms of reference of the current meeting state: The Commission intends to make a proposal for a 
long-term management plan for the anchovy based on the following objectives: 
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3. to ensure the exploitation of the stock at high yields consistent with maximum sustainable 
yield; 
4. to guarantee the stability of the fishery, as far as possible, and with a low risk of stock 
collapse.  
 
ICES advice on Management  
ICES recommended that the fishery should remain closed in 2008 until reliable estimates of the 2008 
SSB and 2007 year class, based on the results from the spring 2008 acoustic and DEPM surveys, 
became available. This implied a closure of the fishery until at least July 2008. 
 
1.1.4. Approach taken by the ad hoc WG on Long-term advice on management 
(2nd meeting) 
The STECF group met in AZTI San Sebastian on Monday 2nd June at 2pm. The group first examined 
the existing operating models: biomass-based and age-structured. The results from the HCR evaluation 
based on each model although following similar trends differ in associated risks. The reasons for the 
differences were investigated. Complete evaluation is conducted on the basis of the biomass-based 
model and the results from the age-structured model are presented for verification. In addition, 
sensitivity of the results to the different models’ structure is analysed.  
 
The economic analysis performed by the group used the data described in the 1st STECF meeting 
Report. In addition, French economic data and of social impact were collated and presented to this 2nd 
meeting. The economic models developed during the first meeting were further developed. A social 
indicator by fleet was constructed to compare the social implications of the HCR investigated. 
A response to the STECF spring plenary questions was drafted and is presented in Annex 1. 
 
1.2. Terms of Reference 
The ToRs of the 1st meeting (April 2008) are still relevant to this one. Those are the following: 
1. Having in mind the two basic objectives of the long-term management plan and the work produced 
in 1999, STECF is requested to provide an updated advice on the strategy to follow.  
In case the new knowledge implies significant changes, recommend adaptations as appropriate.  
2. Given a possible stock recovery under the long term proposal, for each Member State, what 
economic impacts (e.g. costs, revenues) can be expected considering the two scenarios described in 
Commission's non-paper: 
a. strategy with relatively higher TAC levels but higher collapse risks,  
b. strategy with relatively lower TAC levels and less frequent collapse risks. 
 - 7 -3. Given a possible stock recovery under the long term proposal, for each Member State, 
what social impacts (e.g. employment) can be expected considering the two scenarios described in 
Commission's non-paper: 
a. strategy with relatively higher TAC levels but higher collapse risks,  
b. strategy with relatively lower TAC levels and less frequent collapse risks. 
Given the work already performed in the 1st meeting additional, more specific ToRs were proposed: 
i)       Perform the economic and social analyses on the basis of revised data which will include new 
data from France; 
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ii)      Perform the economic and social analyses taking into account the biological uncertainty as 
resulting from the stochastic 10-year projections of the stock and fishery; 
iii) Examine the sensitivity of the results from the HCR evaluation to alternative operating 
models. 
 
1.3. Terms of reference (ToRs) 
The terms of reference for this meeting were: 
 
PART 1. SINGLE-SPECIES MANAGEMENT 
(1) Determine a measure of fishing mortality corresponding to exploitation of the northern stocks of 
hake at maximum sustainable yield (=Fmsy). 
(2) Establish by simulation the comparative benefits of gradually changing the current level of fishing 
mortality on northern hake to Fmsy in steps of (a) 5% per year (b) 10% per year (c) 15%per year. 
(3) The exercise in paragraph 2 should be repeated for moving to Fmsy * 1.2 and Fmsy * 0.8. 
(4) Measures of performance should be calculated including the mean, median, 25th. and 75th. 
percentiles of the following: 
 - Inter-year variability in (a) catches (b) TACs (c) discards 
 - Level of (d) annual catches (e) TACs 
 - Level of (f) fishing mortality 
 - Level of (g) SSB 
 - Level of (h) fishing effort (disaggregated by gear types as appropriate), in kW-days at sea 
needed to take the TAC. 
and the annual risk of SSB falling under Bpa. 
Measures should be calculated in comparison with setting TACs at a level corresponding to Fpa. 
 
PART 2. MULTISPECIES MANAGEMENT 
In parallel with the scenarios calculated in part 1, STECF is requested to calculate (for selected 
relevant scenarios, but including the strategy of moving to Fmsy in 10% annual changes) the effects on 
yields and stock sizes of the principal commercial species caught together with northern hake. 
 
PART 3. OTHER SCENARIOS 
STECF is invited to investigate on its own initiative other scenarios that may be comparable with the 
objectives of fishing a high and stable yield from the stock. 
 
PART 4. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
The simulations calculated here will at a later stage form the basis of an economic impact analysis. The 
implementing methods for this have not yet been developed. 
(1) Identify the data needed for economic analysis purposes - fleets, aggregation, variables  
(2) Ensure compatibility between "economic" and "biological" fleet segments  
(3) Consider the application of the FLR programming approach (incorporating economic components) 
(4) Identify problem areas/potential solutions in applying bio-economic modelling in impact 
assessment (using North Sea flatfish experience). 
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2. Data and methods 
2.1. Data 
2.1.1. Anchovy landings 
Volume of landings of Anchovy in the Bay of Biscay has followed a decreasing trend from 37 000 
tonnes in 2000 to 16 000 tonnes in 2004. During the same period the price increased with the effect of 
a relative constant landing value of around 50 million Euros. Apart from in 2000 and 2001, the French 
pelagic trawlers and purse seines accounted for the biggest share of the landing value. The largest 
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difference is evident in 2003 in which the French landings amounted to 71 % of the total value of 
Anchovy.  
 
Table 2.1.1. Anchovy landings and their value. Source: ICES. Average yearly prices 
 
Year  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 
Spain           
Landings (tons)   19230  23052  6519  3002  7580 
Value (1000 E)  30768  36883  19557  14109  23725 
France           
Landings (tons)   17765  17097  10988  7593  8781 
Value (1000 E)  28424  27355  32964  35687  27485 
Total            
Landings (tons)   36995  40149  17507  10595  16361 
Value (1000 E)  59192  64238  52521  49796  51210 
 
 
The market for Anchovy is mainly concentrated in the Basque country. Even though the TAC is split 
between France and Spain approximately 95 % of the French landings are sold on the Basque market. 
The Basque market is therefore considered to be representative of the whole market for Anchovy.  
The effect of decreasing volume of landings on the average price of Anchovy is clearly evident. In 
2005 the collapse of the anchovy fishery determined the highest prices per kg (Figure 2.1.1). 
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Figure 2.1.1. Anchovy landings in area VIII: quantity, constant value and price.  
2.1.2. Fleet evolution and access regulation measures 
France  
 
The next figure presents the evolution of the number of vessels which harvest at least 1 tons of 
anchovy over the 2000-2004 period and the number of vessels eligible to the licence schemes at the 
end of 2007.  
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Fig 2.1.2.1 Evolution of the number of vessels per fleets in the Area VIII anchovy fishery 
Note : vessels landing at least 1 ton of anchovy over the 2000-2004 * number of vessels in the license scheme at the end of 2007 Source : 
DPMA-IFREMER 
 
The French anchovy fishery in ICES area VIII has been under license schemes since the end of 20071 
and decommissioning schemes were implemented, especially in 2007 to reduce the size of the fleet. 
Three types of licenses defined by the gear used and the degree of historical activity in the fishery from 
2000 to 2004 are considered. The gears for which licenses are allocated are purse-seine and trawl, the 
activity being defined as active or occasional. As a consequence, active purse-seine, active trawl and 
occasional trawl licenses were defined at the end of 2007 and the number of vessels operating under 
the licenses scheme is described in the following figure. 
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Source: DPMA 
Fig. 6.1.2.2. Number of vessels operating under the anchovy licence scheme in 2007. 
 
 
Maximum limits for the three types of licenses were established in terms of total kW and total GT. The 
average vessels technical characteristics for the three types of licences are presented in the table 
2.1.2.1. 
 
Table 2.1.2.1. Average technical characteristics per licence type (2007). Source : DPMA 
Trawlers active Trawlers occasional Purse-seiners active
Length (meters) 18.4 13.9 15.2
Engine power (kW) 322 229 199
Tonnage (GT) 86 36 36  
 
 
The so-called occasional trawlers were not considered hereafter in the bio-economic analysis because 
the annual catches per year per vessel are restricted to a maximum of 20 tons and conditional to the 
                                                 
1 Arrêté du 10 octobre 2007 portant création d’une licence pour la pêche professionnelle de l’anchois (Engraulis 
encrasicolus) dans la zone CIEM VIII. JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE, 8 novembre 
2007 
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anchovy quota available to them. According to the number of these vessels licensed (33), the 
maximum catches for occasional vessels are 660 tons and can be considered low compared to the 
potential catches of the other fleets.  
 
Spain 
The number of Vessels for Spain for the period 1987-2004 has been taken from the series available in 
the last ICES report about this fishery (ICES 2007), except for the year 2003, where a smaller number 
than those appearing in ICES was known to have taken place in the actual fishery that year (Table 
2.1.2.2).  
 
 
 
Time spent fishing anchovy 
 
Estimation of the Spanish Fishing effort (number of days). 
The Spanish fishery on anchovy takes place in spring and it is performed by purse seines coming from 
all the north of Spain from Galicia to the Basque country. As the fishery is mainly located at the South-
eastern corner of the Bay of Biscay, the Basque Fishermen are usually the first to start the fishery, 
followed by Cantabric boats and finally joined (usually at the end of April by Galician boats). This 
dynamic process of increasing number of boats to the fishery from the beginning of April to May, 
when the maximum number of boats occur, and a gradual leaving off the fishery during June, as shown 
in Figure 2.1.2.3. 
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Figure 2.1.2.3: Number of different purse seine boats appearing in the sale records of Basque Country 
fishing ports by Julian day in recent years (AZTI sources).  
 
For each year (1987-2004) the number of purse seiners participating in the spring fishery is known. 
Using the records of anchovy sales occurring in the Basque country ports (AZTI data) the recruitment 
and leaving process of boats to the anchovy was modelled by a double sigmoid curve.  
 
Total daily trips was estimated as the product of the fishing boats targeting anchovy by fortnight (as 
function of the recruitment/leaving process modelled above) and the number of days devoted to 
anchovy fishing by fortnight. The latter is inferred as the total fishing days by fortnight for the period 
mid April and Mid June (when maximums catches occur for this fishery) or as the number of days by 
fortnight with significant catches of anchovy for the remaining period of the first half of the year 
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(significant catches meaning daily catches over 50 t in the Basque Country) (Uriarte pers. comm.). 
Total boats-day trips divided by the maximum total boats participating some time in the fishery sets 
the effective fishing days for the first half of the year. The table below specifies the input data by year: 
 
Table 2.1.2.2: Spanish fleet involved in the Spring fishery for anchovy (Purse seiners) and fishing effort 
estimates according to the total number of boats*day operating in the first half of each year and equivalent 
fishing days (AZTI supplied data).  Max effort is the maximum number of fishing days in the first half of the 
year and %effort is the fraction of time devoted to fishing anchovy by this fleet during the first half of the year. 
Fishing EffortFirst half of the year %  Effort 
Year Fleet BoatxDay Effort (daM axEffortto Anchovy
1987 282 8,630 30.6 90 34%
1988 278 9,404 33.8 90 38%
1989 215 7,099 33.0 90 37%
1990 266 9,126 34.3 90 38%
1991 250 8,608 34.4 90 38%
1992 245 7,509 30.6 90 34%
1993 253 10,000 39.5 90 44%
1994 257 10,409 40.5 90 45%
1995 257 10,611 41.3 90 46%
1996 251 8,799 35.1 90 39%
1997 267 10,910 40.9 90 45%
1998 266 10,715 40.3 90 45%
1999 250 10,378 41.5 90 46%
2000 235 9,068 38.6 90 43%
2001 220 8,934 40.6 90 45%
2002 215 7,900 36.7 90 41%
2003 194 7,151 36.9 90 41%
2004 201 7,453 37.1 90 41%  
 
. 
 
A similar approach was used for the second half of the year: But knowledge was reduced to a few 
years. From them it was deduced that the maximum number of purse seiners participating in the 
anchovy fishery during the second half of the year is about 45% of the number in the first half of the 
year. The division between the numbers of day x boat landings in the Basque Country between this 
numbers of maximum boats gave an average effort of days for the second half of the year, let fixed for 
the period of analysis of about 7 days.   
2.1.3. Economic data  
Spain 
 
Spanish purse seiners 
 
In spring, the economic value of the total landings of purse seines has been historically linked to 
anchovy landings, being anchovy the species with the highest economic value. A decreasing trend in 
total landings value can be seen in the period 2000-2005 (Figure 2.1.3.1).  In 2005 the collapse of the 
anchovy fishery determined the lowest value of landings. 
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Landings and value of the Cantabrian and Basque pelagic fishery: 
Spring seasons 2000-2005
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Figure 2.1.3.1. Historical evolution of total landings and value of landings.  Data comprises landings 
from Cantabrian and Basque purse seines in spring seasons of the period 2000-2005. Source: IEO 
& AZTI`s CAFE Project database (EU contract no 022644). 
 
 
France 
 
Economic data sets were required to estimate parameters of the economic model. Data used were; 
annual income and costs per vessel for a sample of the fleets studied, vessels landings (value, quantity 
for anchovy and other species) for the fleet population by six-month period and annual, effort 
estimation by half of the year and annual. 
 
Evolution the gross revenue and gross revenue per species for a panel of licensed vessels 
 
Panels, defined as constant sets of vessels operating each year from 2000 to 2006 in the anchovy 
fishery were followed taking into consideration their average degree of dependence of vessels on 
anchovy. The degree of dependence per vessel or pairs of vessel (for the pelagic trawlers) was defined 
here, as the percentage of anchovy gross revenues in the total gross revenues over the 2000-2004 
periods. Two categories of vessels were followed according to the gear used to harvest anchovy and 
their length size. These two categories are covering boats that actively harvest anchovy (see the licence 
system description). 19 and 66 vessels belonging to the active purse-seiners and trawlers fleets were 
selected which respectively represents 61% and 93% of the active licensed vessels for the given 
defined categories in 2007. This panel respectively lands 66% and 93% of the anchovy total landings 
per categories over the 2000-2004 period. As shown on the following figure, the total of the landings 
of these two categories represents between 72% and 82% of the French landings. 
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Figure 2.1.3.2. Percentage of panel landings and fleet landings relative to the total French anchovy 
landings.  Source : DPMA-IFREMER 
 
The following graphs present the catches of anchovy compared to the total catches for both fleets. The 
different degrees of dependence on anchovy are here aggregated. The main trend is a decrease in the 
total gross revenues for pelagic trawlers and purse seiners from 2002. A part of this decrease is due to 
the very low level of gross revenues made on anchovy (no catches for the purse seiners from 2004). 
This graph shows that in average in the fleets, the loss of gross revenues due to the anchovy closure are 
partially covered by a raise of the gross revenues made on the other species, which may traduce a 
report of the effort on other species. 
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French Purse-seiners [11-17[m active: evolution of 
the average gross revenues per vessel and per species 
French trawlers [14-25[m active: evolution of the 
gross revenues per vessel and per species 
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Fig. 2.1.3.3. French fleet, evolution of the gross revenues. Note: panel data 2000-2006. Source: 
DPMA-IFREMER 
 
The next figure presents the evolution of average gross revenues per vessel in current euros and index 
(base 100: 2000), with the dependence on anchovy expressed in shares of the gross revenue (<1/3, 
[1/3-2/3[, >2/3, respectively). This degree of dependence can be used to model the variability of the 
fleets and to check more precisely the impact of the closure depending on the past activities of the 
fleets. For the active French trawlers with a dependence on anchovy representing more than 1/3 of the 
landings in value, the reduction in gross revenues in 2005 and 2006 compared to 2000 is around 25%. . 
The decrease in value is more significant while comparing to 2003 and raise up to 40%. For vessels 
with a dependence on anchovy representing less than 1/3, the gross revenues did not decreased over 
the 2005-2006 period. The gross revenue tends to be homogenized for the whole fleet in 2005 and 
2006 with a decrease of the vessel highly dependent on anchovy. The total decrease is around 15% 
compared to 2000 and 25% while comparing to 2003. 
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 Figure 2.1.3.4. French trawlers [14-25] m active. 
 
Notes: panel data 2000-2006, (<1/3, [1/3-2/3[, >2/3), degree of dependence expressed as the share of anchovy gross revenue in total 
gross revenue over the 2000-2004 period Source: DPMA-IFREMER 
 
For French Purse seiners, no boat was dependent on anchovy at a level higher than 2/3 of the total 
gross revenues on the period 2000-2004. The mean gross revenues per boats are quite different 
depending on the degree of dependence on anchovy that is due to a distinction in the fleets of vessels 
operating in the Basque fishery in the first part of the year and a southern Brittany fishery mainly in 
the second half of the year. A decrease in mean gross revenues can be identified between the period 
2002 and 2006 but looking at the index (base: 2000), none of these categories faced a critical drop in 
gross revenues after the anchovy closure compared to 2000. The drop is significant in 2005 and 2006 
compared to the period 2002-2004, especially for the <1/3 dependant vessels.  
 
 
 
French Purse-seiners [11-17[m active: evolution of 
the average gross revenues per vessel and per degree 
of dependence on anchovy  
French Purse-seiners [11-17[m active: Index 
evolution of the average gross revenues per 
vessel and per degree of dependence on anchovy 
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Notes: panel data 2000-2006, (<1/3, [1/3-2/3[, >2/3), degree of dependence expressed as the share of anchovy gross revenue in total 
gross revenue over the 2000-2004 period 
Source: DPMA-IFREMER 
Fig. 2.1.3.5. French purse-seines. 
 
Landings composition evolution expressed in terms of gross revenue for the most important species is 
provided in the next figures according to fleets and degree of dependence to anchovy. The most 
dependant trawlers fleets partially compensated the decline in anchovy landings by a significant 
increase in sea bass landings and to a less extent by albacore and other species. The same trends on sea 
bass can be seen for the less dependant vessels (<1/3 of anchovy landings over the 2000-2004 period). 
For the purse-seiners, especially the less dependant vessels, the targeting of other species is less 
evident as no significant increase in other species landings is identified. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evolution of average gross revenue per species: 
French trawlers [14-25[m active, degree of 
dependence to anchovy >1/3 
Evolution of average gross revenue per species 
anchovy excluded: French trawlers [14-25[m 
active, degree of dependence to anchovy >1/3 
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Income and costs 
 
A sub-sample of vessels operating in the anchovy fishery was selected from the economic sample 
collected under the Data Collection Regulation (DCR) for the period 2002-2006. The sub-sample 
selection was done in the anchovy fleet population defined under the licence scheme described 
previously. In the license scheme established in 2007, three fleets were identified; active purse-seiners, 
active trawlers and occasional trawlers. The sample selection in the previous years, from 2002 to 2006, 
was carried out using the licence fleet stratification conditioned to the rule that individual vessel 
anchovy landings be larger than 1 tons per given year.  
 
The next tables present the size of the sample, the population and the sampling rate for the two 
selected fleets. The length categories [11-17[m and [14-25[m refers to the lower and upper lengths 
limits of each sample and do not refer to management limits.  
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Table 2.1.3.1. Sample, population size in number of vessels and the sampling rate for the two selected 
fleets. 
 
Sample
Segment 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Purse seiners [11-17[m active 13 12 11 3 2
Trawlers [14-25[m active 8 15 16 17 21
Total 21 27 27 20 23
Population
Segment 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Purse seiners [11-17[m active 31 29 29 8 3
Trawlers [14-25[m active 45 50 54 51 48
Total 76 79 83 59 51
Sampling rate
Segment 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Purse seiners [11-17[m active 42% 41% 38% 38% 67%
Trawlers [14-25[m active 18% 30% 30% 33% 44%
Total 28% 34% 33% 34% 45%  
Source: DPMA 
 
Economic indicators calculation is based on the recommendations of the STECF Sub-Group Economic Affairs 
(SGECA). The following indicators were calculated at a more detailed level than required in the current DCR in 
order to be used into the economic model. Average and standard deviation figures are provided in the table 
except for the purse-seine fleet in 2005 and 2006 due to statistical constraints on the size of the sample.  
 
 
 
Table 2.1.3.2. Economic sample: Indicators in terms of average and standard deviation for the main 
French anchovy fleets: purse-seiners [11-17[m active and trawlers [14-25[m active (2000-2006 in 
current Euros). 
 
Purse-seiners [11-17[m 
active
Average in Euros 
(sample) 2 002       2 003       2 004       2 005       2 006       
Standard deviation 
(sample) 2 002       2 003       2 004       2 005       2 006       
  INCOME 316          403          529            INCOME 189          215          205          
  FUELCOST 11            13            17             FUELCOST 5            5            6             
  CREWCOST 160          199          259           CREWCOST 90          95          101        
  REPCOST 22            28            32             REPCOST 21          20          19          
  OTHERCOST 58            87            101            OTHERCOST 25            57            38            
  OTHERCOST 58            87            101           OTHERCOST 25          57          38          
  VARCOST 27            37            42             VARCOST 15          26          13          
  NVARCOST 31            50            59             NVARCOST 11            32            26            
  VARCOST 27            37            42             VARCOST 15          26          13          
  LANDINGCOST 18            28            30             LANDINGCOST 10          21          12          
  FTE 5.5           5.8           6.5            FTE 1.5         1.3         1.3         
Trawlers [14-25[m 
active
Average in Euros 
(sample) 2 002       2 003       2 004       2 005       2 006       
Standard deviation 
(sample) 2 002       2 003       2 004       2 005       2 006       
  INCOME 677          706          543          589          632         INCOME 189        222        163        167          221          
  FUELCOST 81            97            90            100          108            FUELCOST 27            29            30            30            36            
  CREWCOST 291          290          211          227          243         CREWCOST 100        98          67          76            92            
  REPCOST 79            51            58            50            52           REPCOST 39          33          33          38            30            
  OTHERCOST 94            119          115          132          134         OTHERCOST 16          45          45          45            66            
  OTHERCOST 94            119          115          132          134         OTHERCOST 16          45          45          45            66            
  VARCOST 44            53            51            58            59           VARCOST 7            19          17          18            30            
  NVARCOST 50            66            64            74            75           NVARCOST 9            28          30          29            40            
  VARCOST 44            53            51            58            59           VARCOST 7            19          17          18            30            
  LANDINGCOST 29            35            32            38            38           LANDINGCOST 5            13          11          13            20            
  FTE 5.8           5.6           5.4           5.7           5.5             FTE 0.9           1.4           1.3           0.9           1.1            
Source : DPMA according to DCR regulation 
 
 
Indicators presented in the previous table include the income defined as the gross revenues from 
harvesting and other sources of income which are negligible for the vessels studied. Crew cost includes 
the net wages for crew member but also the social security cost paid by the crew member and the 
vessel owner. For the economic model, other costs were split in non variable costs and variable costs. 
In variable costs, landings costs are identified. Nor depreciation costs neither interest costs were 
considered in the analysis.  
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2.2. Stock and Fishery Model 
2.2.1. Stock Dynamics 
The stock dynamics was explained in detail in the Report from the 1st STECF meeting operating model 
which consists of a stock, a fishery model and an observation model. The dynamics of the stock and 
the fishery were modelled on the basis of a biomass model (see section 6.2.1.1 for detail) and an age-
structured model (section 2.2.1.2).  
2.2.1.1. Biomass model 
The stock dynamics is modelled on the basis of the biomass of two age-groups: the 1-year-old and the 
2-plus which comprised fish of age 2 and older. Natural mortality and growth is encompassed in the 
parameter g. A description of the population model and the model conditioning is in Section 2.1 of the 
Report from the 1st STECF meeting. 
2.2.1.2. Age-structured model 
An age-structured operating model using an FLR framework was implemented to verify the results 
from the biomass model and to test the sensitivity of the results to a different model structure. This 
model was based on a seasonal multi-fleet integrated catch at age assessment (MFICA) as the one used 
in ICES 2005. Consists of 4 age-groups where the dynamics is introduced by natural (M) and fishing 
mortality (F). While M is constant across ages and time, F is separable on a half year basis and can be 
expressed as the product of the fishing mortality (Fy,s), where y corresponds to year and s to either the 
first of 2nd half of the year, and selectivity at age Sa. A full description of the population model and the 
model conditioning is in Section 2.1 of the Report from the 1st STECF meeting. 
 
2.2.1.3. Stock and recruitment model 
A number of models were compared (Report STECF/SGBRE 0801) and the analysis indicated the use 
of a Ricker and a quadratic hockey-stick in the operating models. However, results suggested little 
sensitivity to the choice of model. Therefore, given paucity of time some of the scenarios tested were 
based on the Ricker model only. 
A third scenario of persistent low recruitment was considered for testing. In this case recruitment was 
drawn randomly from a normal distribution with mean = 19 000 tons and standard deviation = 9 200 
tons (ICES 2007). 
2.2.1.4. Selectivity and catchability models 
Selectivity of the fishery is assumed flat in the biomass model while the age-structured model uses 
selectivity at age parameterised in the MFICA. The features of the models are fully explained in the 
Report STECF/SGBRE 0801. 
2.2.1.5. Allocation of catches by six-month periods and countries 
The allocation of catches between countries and to the 1st or 2nd half of the year is performed as 
illustrated in Figure 2.2.1.5. First, the TAC is allocated between countries and then the catch per 
country is allocated to six-month periods (From 1st January to 30th June and from 1st July to 31st 
December).  
Two options were explored for the country allocation:  
(a) historical allocation computed as the average of the past series  
(b) variable allocation depending on the TAC (see Report STECF/SGBRE 0801 for a full 
description).  
Similarly, two schemes were considered for the country allocation by half of the year:  
(A) historical allocation for both countries  
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(B) intermediate allocation for France computed as the average between the historical 
allocation and the one that would result if the French winter fishery disappears (see annex see Annex II 
of the Report STECF/SGBRE 0801 for a full description).     
 
In this report the same allocation schemes as the ones used in the 1st STECF meeting have been used: 
(1) Constant TAC allocation: Both the allocation by countries and the country allocation by 
half of the year are done according to the historical series (cases a and A). 
(2) Variable TAC allocation. The allocation by countries is variable (case b) and the country 
allocation by half of the year is intermediate for France (case B) 
 
In addition, in order to study the sensitivity of the results to the country allocation, additional 
simulations were performed where the allocation by country ranged from 50 to 50% to 90% Spain to 
10% France in steps of 10%. The country allocation by half of the year was intermediate according to 
the scheme B.  
   
 
 
Figure 2.2.1.5: Diagram representing the annual TAC allocation process by Country and Half of the 
year 
 
2.3. Economic model  
The group attempted a socioeconomic evaluation of different management strategies. For doing so, 
results obtained from the biological side were analyzed in terms of the overall performance of the 
fishery, as well as the performance of each of the fleets involved in it. 
The economic analysis is based on the catchability coefficients per half of the year derived from the 
estimation of the production functions for each of the fleets involved in the anchovy fishery and the 
estimation of a demand function for the overall fishery. Since the fleets are also involved in other 
target species, an overall production function and a price model for other species have also been 
incorporated for each of the fleets. The main economic indicators included in the simulation model are 
the gross revenues and the cash flow by fleets, which has been derived based on the standard income 
sharing remuneration system and other related fix and variable costs such as landing fees, fuel, bait, ice 
and gear costs. The fishermen wages have been used as the social indicator to simulate the future 
performance of the fishery. This indicator permits to compare the average wage derived from the 
fishing activity and the average wage of any other economic sectors. Thus, it may be considered as a 
proxy for the social welfare surrounding the fleets participating in the anchovy fishery.   
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a) Production function for anchovy 
The production model is based on 6 restricted (α=β=δ=1)2 standard Cobb Douglas production 
functions, which have been estimated by half year and fleet for the periods 1987-2004 (in the case of 
Spanish purse seines) and 2000-2004 (for French seines and trawlers) on the basis of the following 
functional form (1): 
Yais = qais ⋅ SSBaisαs ⋅ NBaisβs ⋅ Eaisδs       (1) 
The subscript s =(1,2) stands for six-month period January - June (half of the year 1) and July-
December (half of the year 2), t for the year, i the fleet and a for the anchovy fishery. Catchability (q) 
corresponds to the fraction of the fish stock which is caught by a defined unit of the fishing effort, NB 
is the number of vessels, SSB the spawning stock biomass and, finally, aisE corresponds to the time 
spent by the fleet ( i ) in the anchovy fishery ( a ) in half year s. The estimated catchability coefficients, 
the related standard errors and adjusted R2 are shown is Table 6.3.1. 
 
Table 2.3.1: Estimated catchability parameters per fleet (i) and half year (s).  
Fleet Parameter Value Std. error R2 
i=SPS1 qai1 0.0024 0.0001 0.89
i=SPS2 qai2 0.0038 0.0007 0.59
i=FPSS1 qai1 0.0008 0.0004 0.39
i=FPSS2 qai2 0.0050 0.0012 077 
i=FPT1 qai1 0.0026 0.0008 0.62
i=FPT2 qai1 0.0083 0.0011 0.91
 
(Spanish purse-seiners), FPS (French purse-seiners) and FPT (French trawlers).  
 
a.1) Time spent in the anchovy fishery  
Since the vessels operating in the anchovy fishery have also another target species the time spent in the 
anchovy fishery has to be imputed. In order to do so and based on definitions (2) and (3), equation 4 
has been used, which stands that the time spent in anchovy fishery is the minimum derived from 
production technology in order to catch the quota in each half year.  
Notice that the maximum level of nominal effort spent at sea isE by fleet i in half year s is defined by 
equation (2): 
oitsaitsis EEE +=         (2) 
where, Eaits  is the nominal effort spent by fleet i in anchovy fishery and Eoits  is the nominal effort 
spent by fleet i in other fisheries. 
Following that: 
 2121 oitoitaitaitit EEEEE +++=      (3)  
                                                 
2 Due to the lack of degrees of freedom for the French fleets, the production elasticity of the catches for SSB, NB and E, that is, (α, β, δ) 
are assumed to be equal to 1.  
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Since the TAC is divided for Spain and France,  
−= TACQuotaFrance SpainQuota  
Furthermore, taking into account that France has two different fleets, purse seine fleet (PS) and pelagic 
trawler fleet (PT) the derived quotas will be: 
FrancePSPS QuotaShareQuota *=      (5a) 
QuotaPT = (1− SharePS )*QuotaFrance                 (5b) 
b.1) Production Function for other species 
A set of simplified production functions for the landings of other species by each of the two half years 
have been estimated (6) for each of the fleets under the assumption that production elasticities are 
equal to 1 (i.e. β=δ=1). Notice also that (6) implies that there is no biomass effect in the function for 
the landings of the other species. As shown in Table 2.3.2, all the estimated coefficients (kois) are 
significant at usual significance levels and are correctly assigned. 
Yoits = kois ⋅ NBaitsβ ⋅ Eoitsδ  for s=1,2     (6) 
 where kois ~ N(meanKois ,θKois ), and Eoits  comes from (2) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.3.2: Estimated k parameters per fleet (i) and half of the year (s) 
Fleets Parameter Value Std. error R2 
i=SPS kai1 253.1 35.03 0.96
i=FPS1 kai1 281.7 9.2 0.99
i=FPS2 kai2 704.4 49.2 0.97
i=FPT1 kai1 271.2 15.99 0.98
i=FPT2 kai1 293.8 20.1 0.97
 
Notice that for the Spanish purse seines (SPS) only a yield by year function is estimated (this may 
imply an over estimation of the gross revenue), while for the French fleets (i.e. FPS, FPL) the other 
species production function is by half year. This has important implications for the simulation model.  
 
c) Price functions 
c.1. Price function for anchovy 
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Two data sets have been merged (i.e. Basque and French total anchovy landings from the auction 
market in the Atlantic harbours) in order to calculate an average half year first sale price for the 
landings coming from area VIII. The total landings represent 85% to 99% of the total landings 
according to ICES report. Constant prices (€2006) per half year and total landings from ICES report 
have been used in the estimations. Two alternative demand models have been checked and estimated 
from data for the period 2000-2006: (Model 1) A semi-log price (P) model including 2 independent 
variables (i.e total anchovy landings (Y) (7), and half year (SEM) and; (Model 2) a semi-log restricted 
one, only including landings (7’). A priori Y is expected to influence negatively on prices. SEM is a 
dummy, taking value 1 for the landings done in the first half year of the year. The variable SEM may 
be in fact capturing gear, size and quality effects. In the second half of the year the fishery is mainly 
exploited by pelagic trawlers and according to the species characteristics, anchovies are smaller and 
they have more fat content, which is less valued by the canning industry. Accordingly SEM is 
expected to positively influence on prices.  
astastast SEMcYLogbaP *))((* ++=      (7) 
))((* astast YLogbaP +=      (7’) 
All the coefficients are significant at usual levels, have the expected sign and the have an adequate 
overall fit (Table 2.3.3). Regarding the sign of the parameters, the estimated effect for the volume of 
landings is negative and anchovies landed in the first half of the year reach higher prices. The F test in 
order to discriminate between the two models (F=3.68, p=0.08) stands that there exists statistical 
evidence in favour of model 1, although the degree of significance in not clearly determinant.   
 
Table  2.3.3. Estimated parameters for the demand function  
 Fleet Value Std. error R2 F 
a 22.37 2.7417 0.85 32.56
b -2.15 0.2963 - - 
Model 
1 
c 1.05 0.0041 - - 
a 24.07 2.9211 0.81 48.77Model 
2 b -2.27 0.3259 - - 
 
The price models performance is shown below: 
Model 1 
The estimated prices for a theoretical TAC using model 1 are shown in the following graph: 
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Figure 2.3.1. Estimated prices using model 1 
 
And the corresponding value of the TAC will be 
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Figure 6.3.2. Value of the TAC using model 1. 
Where the maximum value is obtained at a TAC level of 32000 tonnes. 
 
Model 2 
The estimated prices for a theoretical TAC using model 2 are shown in the following graph: 
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Figure 2.3.3. Estimated prices using model 2 
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Figure 2.3.4. Value of the TAC using model 2, where the maximum value is obtained at a TAC level 
of 29000 tonnes. Note that in model 2 the price function is higher for 2nd half of the year. This is 
because the 0.6-0.4 allocation for first and second half of the year was used. Then, the lower the 
landings the higher the price which overshoots the first half of the year fixed effect. 
 
Giving that model 1 has a higher R2 and based on the results from the F-test which discriminates 
between the two models and favours model 1 (F=3.68, p = 0.08), we have selected this model for 
running the simulation. In any case further research should be made on this basis, in order to check if 
the price function shape is what we have assumed and also to check if both countries differ in their 
price formation. 
 
c.2. Price for others species 
The price of other species (Poi) is assumed fixed, although different for each fleets involved in the 
fishery. Note that for the French fleets each Poi was estimated by half year, while in the case of Spanish 
seiners was done annually. Prices for other species were calculated as an average for the period 2000-
2004 (constant € 2006) as follows:  
  28
Poi = (ROL–RAL)/(OL–LA) 
Where ROL is the revenue related to overall landings, RAL is the specific revenue from anchovy, OL is 
the overall landings and LA is landings anchovy.  
Poi takes the value 2.5 for the Spanish seines, 0.98-0.61 for French purse-seines during half year 1 and 
2 respectively and, finally 2-2.18 for French trawlers during half years 1 and 2 (see Table 2.3.2.1).  
 
2.3.1. Economic indicators 
d.1) Gross revenue (GR) 
The fleet gross revenue ( itGR ) (8) is the sum of the anchovy revenues and other fisheries gross 
revenues: 
2121 oitoitaitaitit GRGRGRGRGR +++=     (8) 
 where aitsaitaits YpGR .=  and oitsoioiti YpGR .=  
d.2) Net revenue (NR) 
The net revenue related to anchovy ( NRait ) and other species ( NRoit ) is defined as: 
 ( ) aititait GR=NR ×− fee Landing1      (9a)
 ( ) oititoit GR=NR ×− fee Landing1     (9b) 
where the landing fee is a percentage of the gross revenue (GR) imputed to anchovy an other species.  
d.3) Revenue to be shared: vessels share and crew share 
The revenue to be shared (RTBS) is defined as the difference between the net revenue and the so-
called “shared cost” (SC)3: 
aitaitait SCNR=RTBS −       (10a) 
oitoitoit SCNR=RTBS −      (10b) 
The shared cost )( itSC for the French and Spanish fleets
4 are respectively: 
( ) aiaitiiiiait NBE+++=SC ××FoodcIcecBaitcFuelc  for Spanish seines 
( ) aioitiiiiait NBESS++=SC ××+FoodcIcecBaitc for French seines and trawlers 
The vessels (VS) and crews share (CS) for the given fleet follows respectively: 
aitiait RTBS=VS .ϕ      (11a) 
oitioit RTBS=VS .ϕ      (11b) 
aitiait RTBS=CS ).1( ϕ−     (12a) 
oitioit RTBS=CS ).1( ϕ−  ( 1≤iϕ )   (12b) 
d.4) Cash flow 
                                                 
3 The operating cost data for the Basque purse seines have been derived from an homogeneous vessel type performance 
operating in the anchovy fishery during the years 2000-04 and are in constant prices (€2007). 
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Based on the previous equations the fleet cash flow is then: 
aiiioitaitit NBSSVFCVSVS=FCF ).( −−+ for the French fleets    (13a) 
( )aiiaiioitaitit NBNBFCVSVS=FCF ×−−+ Fuelc.  for the Spanish fleet  (13b) 
where FC5 stands for the fixed costs. 
Due to the relative importance of the fuel cost in the total fishing cost and the evolution on fuel prices 
since the last years, it has been assumed that ),(~.
ii FuelcFuelci
meanNFuelc θ . Moreover, the uncertainty 
has also extended to fix costs, that is ),(~.
ii FCFCi
meanNFC θ . 
 
e) Social indicator 
A comparison is made between the average wage derived from the fishing activity and the “normal” 
average wage (Wagenormal) of any other economic sector. For doing so we define FTEi as the full time 
equivalent of the average vessel for each fleet. Where FTE = 1 corresponds to a full-time fisherman, 
therefore a fleet i that has on average x number of crew working full-time will have FTEi = x.  
 
Social indicator (Fr)i = 
CSait +CSoit − SSCit
FTEi
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ 
Wagenormal (Fr)
    (14a) 
Social indicator (Sp) = 
CSat +CSot
FTE
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ 
Wagenormal (Sp)
     (14b) 
 
Where values above 1 imply that average wage for these fleets are higher than the one obtained in an 
alternative economic sector, and the other way around for cases lower than 1.  
 
 
2.3.2. Model parameters 
A list of the economic model estimable parameters is shown in Table 2.3.2.1. 
Table 2.3.2.1. Economic model: parameter estimates. 
 
 
NAME Comments SPS FPS FPT 
r Discount rate 0,05 0,05 0,05 
E  Maximum time per year 1 1 1 
POR_MS_1 Percentage of the anchovy quota by fleet 1 0,058113357 0,941886643 
Fuel Cost Fuel Expenditure in a by year and vessel 82000 22539,43073 98478,29681 
Bait Cost Bait Expenditure in a by year and vessel 0 0 0 
                                                                                                                                                                       
4 For the Spanish fleet a simplification of the shared system has been considered given that the shared costs systems differs 
between regions. 
5 Social security cost paid by the vessel owner 
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Ice Cost Ice Expenditure in a by year and vessel 0 0 0 
Food Cost Food Expenditure in a by year and vessel 0 0 0 
Gear Cost Gear Expenditure in a by year and vessel 6046 0 0 
SS Cost SS Expenditure in a by year and vessel 35867 0 0 
OtherVARCost Other Expenditure in a by year and vessel 20689 9431,266669 11194,12629 
LandingCost % of Income 0,025 0,061548167 0,051355711 
Fixed Costs Fixed Costs 56753 73101,28468 121511,7238 
qa1 Catchability first half of the year anchovy 0,0024505 0,0008672 0,0026516 
αa1 Elasticity of Number of vessels Sem1 1 1 1 
βa1 Elasticity of SSB Sem1 1 1 1 
γa1 Elasticity of Time to anchovy Sem1 1 1 1 
qa2 Catchability second half of the year anchovy 0,0038713 0,005077 0,008321 
αa2 Elasticity of Number of vessels Sem2 1 1 1 
βa2 Elasticity of SSB Sem2 1 1 1 
γa2 Elasticity of Time to anchovy Sem2 1 1 1 
NB1 Number of vessels sem 1 200 31 71 
NB2 Number of vessels sem 2 200 31 71 
ko Catchability other species 253,11 NA NA 
α0 Elasticity  Number of vessels others 1 1 1 
γ0 Elasticity of Time to others 1 1 1 
P0 Price of other species 2,35 NA NA 
FTE Average Full time employmet 13 5,886027507 5,554762189 
W Alternative wage 19802 20600 20600 
E1 Maximum Time Half of the year 1 (months) 0,5 0,5 0,5 
Vessel Share % of RTBS 0,5 0,499550603 0,518781068 
% Q by fleet Percentage of the MS Quota by fleet 1 0,101527086 0,898472914 
SSV SS Paid by the vessel in Ä by year and vessel 0 22310,42551 21054,79593 
SSC SS Paid by the vessel in Ä by year and vessel 0 19982,47262 18857,86011 
k01 Catchability “other species” 1st sem NA 281,745 271,221 
k02 Catchability “other specie” 2nd sem NA 704,406 293,877 
P01 Price of “other species” 1st sem NA 0,98 2 
P02 Price of “other species” 2nd sem NA 0,61 2,18 
 
 
2.4. Management approaches evaluated 
The STECF 2nd meeting on Anchovy management considered the implications for the stock and the 
fishery of two basic harvest control rules. The rules were tested for four types of constraints and for 
two basic allocation schemes as described in section 2.2.1.5 and in the Report from the 1st STECF 
meeting (STECF/SGBRE 0801).  
2.4.1. Harvest Control Rules 
Two basic strategies were evaluated with respect to what proportion of the available stock could be 
harvested:  
 
• Rule A. constant proportion above an escapement  
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• Rule B. constant proportion 
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In both cases 1ˆ −yBSS  is the biomass estimated from the spring surveys and γ is a constant parameter to 
be set. And TAC is applied from subsequent July to June next year. The biological reference points 
Blim and Bpa correspond to 21,000 and 33,000 tones respectively. 
 
The performance of each rule was tested for γ values between 0 and 1 by steps of 0.1. 
 
Rule C 
In addition, the following HCR was tested: 
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This rule was selected by fishermen in the SWW RAC that met in March 2008. This was seen at the 
time, as a compromise between short term risk and their harvest interests. This rule can be considered 
a special case of rule A where the threshold is 26,500 tonnes and the parameter γ = 0.766. Given the 
Sector interest in this rule it will be evaluated separately. 
2.4.1.1. Constraints  
For each of the strategies outlined above, the effect of two additional measures was evaluated. On the 
one hand, the HCRs with and without a ceiling equal to 33,000 tonnes (the historically fixed level of 
TAC set to this fishery)  
 { }33000 ,min yy TACTAC = . 
 
On the other hand the HCRs with and without a minimum TAC corresponding to the smallest catch 
that allows the fishery to remain economically viable (at 7,000 tonnes, as pointed out by the SWW 
RAC and confirmed in the economic analysis of this report). 
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2.4.2. Summary Statistics  
A number of statistics were used to evaluate the performance of the HCR relative to management 
objectives such as conservation and maximizing yields. The summary statistics presented in this 
Report are the following: 
 
a) Median SSB (SSBmed). Median Spawning Stock Biomass across years and iterations. 
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b) End SSB (SSBEnd/last). Median of the SSB in the last year of the projection period across iterations. 
 
c) Risk SSB< Blim. Probability of the SSB falling below Blim in any year of the projection period 
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d) Risk of SSB<Blim once. Probability of the SSB falling below Blim at least once in the projection 
period 
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e) Probability of the fishery being closed (i.e. TAC=0) in any year of the projection period 
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f) Probability of the fishery being closed at least once in the projection period 
 
[ ]
iter
iter y
yiter
once N
TACII
closurep
∑ ∑ ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ ≥⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ =
=
10
)(
,
 
g) Average catch (in tonnes) across years and iterations 
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h) Average standard deviation of the catch 
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i) Inter-annual catch variation (ICV) 
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In the above equations yiterSSB , , yiterC ,  and yiterTAC ,  denote respectively the Spawning Stock Biomass, 
the catch and the TAC in year y and iteration iter, whereas yN  and iterN  are the number of years in the 
projection period and the number of iterations in the simulation. ( )⋅I  is an indicator function that takes 
the value 1 if the condition within the brackets is fulfilled and 0 otherwise.    
2.4.3. Fleet regulation 
Given the large variability both in distribution and abundance exhibited by the anchovy the 
Commission anchovy Non-paper states the following: 
 
To adequately manage this fishery, it is necessary to establish a plan to ensure that the annual effort 
deployed to the fishery corresponds to the catch possibilities available. Since it would not be possible 
to establish a fixed effort level per year (due to the fluctuations referred to above) it will be necessary 
for the MS involved to prepare, in the context of this management plan, an annual effort management 
plan. 
The elements of effort management may have two components: 
- A component of annual adjustment of effort, to reflect the fluctuating nature of the 
annual biomass available to fish. Given that this fishery is largely conducted by vessels 
that have other fishing opportunities throughout the year, this may be based on 
redeployment plans. 
- A component of capacity adjustment. In the long term scenarios analysed above, 
average catch availabilities are projected. Over and beyond adaptations to the annual 
fluctuations, it would also be necessary to evaluate if the current fleets are adequate to 
catch the average levels of anchovy that would result from the long term plan. To the 
point that the fleets involved may or may not have alternative species to catch, the 
Member States involved should reflect how to address the problem of adjusting the 
effort every year, in a context where the European Fisheries Fund does not allow for 
unlimited use of public funds for temporary lay-ups. The need for voluntary scrapping 
should be a function of the possibilities for the concerned fleets to re-deploy to other 
fisheries when the catch limits for anchovy are low. 
The STECF anchovy group in its 2nd meeting considered the possibility of evaluating the economic 
impact of regulating fleet size. A scenario of fleet reduction was considered but was not developed 
because of time constrains. 
2.4.4. Considerations regarding closed area measures 
The Commission NON-PAPER when considering Long term management for anchovy in Bay of 
Biscay refers to technical measures and states the following: 
 
Furthermore, time- area closures should also be considered and put into place as part of the plan. An 
area to protect juveniles, allowing a larger part of the newly recruited to spawn should reinforce the 
current system. Key nursery areas as the one proposed by ICES in 1999 around the Gironde estuary 
should be considered whenever the spring assessment reveals a critical level of biomass (say B below 
Bpa). The possibility to establish areas to protect adults during spawning should also be examined. 
Side effects of this measure and boundaries should be monitored and evaluated by STECF.  
 
An integration of a Random Utility Model fit in ISIS-Fish is under development to evaluate the effect 
of TACs, Marine Protected Areas and effort regulations on the pelagic fishery, Vermard et al. (ICES 
2008). ISIS-Fish is a spatially and seasonally explicit simulation tool especially designed to explore 
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management measures impact on mixed fisheries including fishermen reactions to management. ISIS-
Fish had already been used to simulate the pelagic fishery in the Bay of Biscay (Lehuta et al., in prep). 
The model described the dynamic of the anchovy (Engraulis encrasicolus) population and its 
exploitation but effort allocation was fixed (corresponding to the average historical pattern). To fill this 
gap, a fleet dynamic model simulating metiers choice using Random Utility Modelling (RUM) was 
developed including trip components (a lagged value of the main species caught, lagged percentage of 
effort spent in the different metiers, inertia to change from one metier to another) (Vermard et al. 
2008). This model is expected to account for the fleet re-distribution both spatially or in the case the 
effort is re-allocated to other fishes when the closure is imposed. In the case of a spatial re-distribution 
it is assumed that the fleet continues to target anchovy. The model was parameterised on the basis of 
survey data of fish distribution and on distribution of the French fleet.  
 
3. Results and Discussion 
3.1. Biological Model  
3.1.1. Biomass Based Model 
Results corresponding to the management strategy evaluation using the biomass based model are 
presented for the two strategies investigated (Rules A and B) in Figures and Tables 3.1.1.1 and 2 
respectively and with further detail in Tables of Appendix II. 
For Rule A. Harvesting with a constant proportion above an escapement SSB level: 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.1.1.1: Summary results of the performance of Harvest Control Rule A: Harvesting with a 
constant proportion above an escapement SSB level.  Complete results can be seen in Tables of 
Appendix I. 
 
HCR
Allocat  % 
Spain
SR HR TACmax TACmin
Median 
SSBlast
P(SSB<Blim)
P(SSB<Blim 
once)
P(closure)
P(closure 
once)
Average 
catch
Average sd 
catch
Rule A cte ricker 0.1 no no 81911 0.009 0.055 0.021 0.157 6762 5081
Rule A cte ricker 0.2 no no 70772 0.017 0.115 0.029 0.205 12049 9929
Rule A cte ricker 0.3 no no 61088 0.029 0.186 0.047 0.303 16057 14640
Rule A cte ricker 0.4 no no 55529 0.052 0.293 0.066 0.402 18998 18075
Rule A cte ricker 0.5 no no 48509 0.082 0.446 0.102 0.552 22230 22847
Rule A cte ricker 0.6 no no 44332 0.137 0.631 0.146 0.698 23193 25740
Rule A cte ricker 0.7 no no 39955 0.174 0.722 0.179 0.765 24845 28996
Rule A cte ricker 0.8 no no 35967 0.236 0.819 0.230 0.854 24265 30160
Rule A cte ricker 0.9 no no 32033 0.293 0.890 0.278 0.913 24592 31107
Rule A cte ricker 1 no no 28303 0.331 0.932 0.315 0.935 24854 32952
Rule A cte ricker 0.1 33000 no 80266 0.010 0.068 0.023 0.173 6416 4745
Rule A cte ricker 0.2 33000 no 70658 0.013 0.090 0.029 0.216 11313 7935
Rule A cte ricker 0.3 33000 no 64181 0.026 0.178 0.042 0.293 14294 9617
Rule A cte ricker 0.4 33000 no 60222 0.043 0.252 0.060 0.371 16241 10563
Rule A cte ricker 0.5 33000 no 56348 0.058 0.337 0.073 0.432 17684 11032
Rule A cte ricker 0.6 33000 no 53779 0.075 0.422 0.087 0.500 18747 11532
Rule A cte ricker 0.7 33000 no 49222 0.093 0.475 0.104 0.552 19106 11625
Rule A cte ricker 0.8 33000 no 47626 0.113 0.546 0.122 0.627 19675 11829
Rule A cte ricker 0.9 33000 no 47818 0.132 0.580 0.138 0.640 20242 11945
Rule A cte ricker 1 33000 no 45672 0.141 0.614 0.146 0.657 20896 11865
Rule A cte ricker 0.1 no 7000 84366 0.008 0.057 0.635 0.999 4622 6339
Rule A cte ricker 0.2 no 7000 73316 0.007 0.055 0.377 0.961 10960 11224
Rule A cte ricker 0.3 no 7000 63224 0.021 0.134 0.302 0.942 15537 15585
Rule A cte ricker 0.4 no 7000 56574 0.040 0.246 0.289 0.922 18850 19285
Rule A cte ricker 0.5 no 7000 48899 0.075 0.406 0.292 0.928 21733 23680
Rule A cte ricker 0.6 no 7000 43466 0.131 0.603 0.323 0.942 22743 26451
Rule A cte ricker 0.7 no 7000 38374 0.172 0.710 0.346 0.967 23819 28816
Rule A cte ricker 0.8 no 7000 37158 0.224 0.819 0.368 0.980 24249 30606
Rule A cte ricker 0.9 no 7000 31354 0.274 0.862 0.391 0.980 24954 32187
Rule A cte ricker 1 no 7000 27677 0.337 0.925 0.435 0.987 24701 34065
Rule A cte ricker 0.1 33000 7000 80138 0.007 0.052 0.627 1.000 4599 6052
Rule A cte ricker 0.2 33000 7000 72941 0.010 0.070 0.372 0.967 10347 9331
Rule A cte ricker 0.3 33000 7000 65856 0.019 0.123 0.296 0.926 13480 10729
Rule A cte ricker 0.4 33000 7000 61434 0.032 0.211 0.262 0.893 15718 11462
Rule A cte ricker 0.5 33000 7000 56776 0.049 0.295 0.247 0.880 17250 11822
Rule A cte ricker 0.6 33000 7000 56767 0.066 0.378 0.242 0.877 18333 12051
Rule A cte ricker 0.7 33000 7000 53738 0.083 0.454 0.246 0.881 18907 12414
Rule A cte ricker 0.8 33000 7000 48437 0.107 0.535 0.241 0.879 19591 12487
Rule A cte ricker 0.9 33000 7000 47285 0.119 0.553 0.242 0.848 20040 12351
Rule A cte ricker 1 33000 7000 47769 0.143 0.618 0.242 0.857 20437 12481  
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The higher the harvest rate (γ) the higher the catches and the biological risks. In addition, the catches 
are subjected to larger variability. The four cases of different TAC constrains behave quite similarly in 
terms of risks and average catches up to γ = 0.3. Above that, those which have a maximum TAC of 
33,000 t result in smaller catches (but less variable) and smaller risks than the others at similar harvest 
rates. Setting a minimum TAC (of 7000 t) increases the chances of closing the fishery, but do not 
affect the rest of performance indicators. 
If no upper TAC ceiling is imposed risks of the stock falling Blim between 5 - 10% correspond to γ =  
0.4 - 0.5 (with average catches between 19,000 and 22,000 t). While similar risks correspond to 
γ between 0.5 and 0.7 (with average catches lower than 19,200 t) when an upper TAC ceiling = 33,000 
tonnes is imposed.  
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Figure 3.1.1.1: Performance statistics (probability of SSB falling below Blim, probability of closing the 
fishery, the average catch and average SD  in catch)depending on the harvest rate  for Rule A 
(harvesting with a constant proportion above an escapement SSB level) in the biomass model  (using 
BBM) with the Ricker SR model.. Solid, dashed, dotted and dot-dashed lines represent the case 
without any restriction on the TAC, with a maximum TAC restriction of 33,000 t, with a minimum 
viable TAC of  7,000 t and with a maximum TAC restriction of 33,000 t and a minimum viable TAC 
of 7,000 t respectively. 
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For Rule B. Harvesting a constant proportion of the SSB 
 
Table 3.1.1.2: Summary results of the performance of Harvest Control Rule B. Harvesting a constant 
proportion of the SSB.  Complete results can be seen in Tables of Appendix I. 
 
HCR
Allocat  % 
Spain
SR HR TACmax TACmin
Median 
SSBlast
P(SSB<Blim)
P(SSB<Blim 
once)
P(closure)
P(closure 
once)
Average 
catch
Average sd 
catch
Rule B cte ricker 0.1 no no 74742 0.017 0.109 0.033 0.217 8145 5132
Rule B cte ricker 0.2 no no 66586 0.033 0.188 0.047 0.297 14791 10115
Rule B cte ricker 0.3 no no 52052 0.068 0.373 0.081 0.461 19423 14776
Rule B cte ricker 0.4 no no 46756 0.124 0.586 0.134 0.666 22681 19557
Rule B cte ricker 0.5 no no 36970 0.206 0.774 0.205 0.820 24106 22717
Rule B cte ricker 0.6 no no 32361 0.263 0.854 0.255 0.880 25718 26215
Rule B cte ricker 0.7 no no 26132 0.353 0.952 0.331 0.948 25600 28724
Rule B cte ricker 0.8 no no 22891 0.438 0.977 0.403 0.986 25024 31364
Rule B cte ricker 0.9 no no 20482 0.493 0.991 0.451 0.993 24775 32497
Rule B cte ricker 1 no no 16997 0.544 0.996 0.497 0.997 23850 33112
Rule B cte ricker 0.1 33000 no 79634 0.013 0.090 0.026 0.192 8339 5047
Rule B cte ricker 0.2 33000 no 64231 0.033 0.191 0.048 0.300 13961 7995
Rule B cte ricker 0.3 33000 no 56043 0.063 0.360 0.078 0.462 17218 9503
Rule B cte ricker 0.4 33000 no 49525 0.107 0.516 0.117 0.584 19164 10574
Rule B cte ricker 0.5 33000 no 47530 0.145 0.607 0.156 0.677 20384 11309
Rule B cte ricker 0.6 33000 no 43325 0.172 0.668 0.172 0.709 21423 11745
Rule B cte ricker 0.7 33000 no 40997 0.204 0.738 0.194 0.748 21629 12220
Rule B cte ricker 0.8 33000 no 37040 0.236 0.769 0.228 0.797 21352 12665
Rule B cte ricker 0.9 33000 no 39843 0.242 0.776 0.234 0.807 21582 12792
Rule B cte ricker 1 33000 no 36248 0.268 0.800 0.252 0.822 21345 12973
Rule B cte ricker 0.1 no 7000 79209 0.008 0.054 0.479 0.994 6551 6911
Rule B cte ricker 0.2 no 7000 66498 0.023 0.156 0.188 0.779 14219 10553
Rule B cte ricker 0.3 no 7000 54622 0.061 0.343 0.196 0.790 19204 15429
Rule B cte ricker 0.4 no 7000 45459 0.108 0.531 0.227 0.854 22947 19962
Rule B cte ricker 0.5 no 7000 37439 0.202 0.761 0.300 0.940 24029 23085
Rule B cte ricker 0.6 no 7000 32910 0.276 0.891 0.350 0.961 25283 26622
Rule B cte ricker 0.7 no 7000 27644 0.356 0.946 0.411 0.984 25790 29732
Rule B cte ricker 0.8 no 7000 24286 0.420 0.973 0.466 0.995 24771 31354
Rule B cte ricker 0.9 no 7000 19245 0.493 0.989 0.512 0.998 24628 32537
Rule B cte ricker 1 no 7000 20094 0.533 0.990 0.546 0.998 24151 33630
Rule B cte ricker 0.1 33000 7000 83760 0.007 0.048 0.479 0.992 6480 6681
Rule B cte ricker 0.2 33000 7000 68240 0.022 0.145 0.187 0.782 13524 8626
Rule B cte ricker 0.3 33000 7000 57626 0.060 0.334 0.182 0.750 17268 10121
Rule B cte ricker 0.4 33000 7000 52933 0.093 0.488 0.211 0.825 19191 11224
Rule B cte ricker 0.5 33000 7000 44863 0.138 0.624 0.241 0.857 19877 11661
Rule B cte ricker 0.6 33000 7000 40147 0.181 0.690 0.264 0.857 20596 12284
Rule B cte ricker 0.7 33000 7000 41276 0.203 0.743 0.274 0.881 21069 12799
Rule B cte ricker 0.8 33000 7000 38213 0.244 0.792 0.297 0.877 20935 12923
Rule B cte ricker 0.9 33000 7000 34291 0.244 0.775 0.286 0.872 21515 12908
Rule B cte ricker 1 33000 7000 35121 0.267 0.803 0.306 0.887 21164 13291  
 
The results are quite similar to the former case in general terms: The higher the harvest rate (γ) the 
higher the catches and the risks, in addition the catches are subjected to larger variability.  The four 
cases of different TAC constrains behave quite similarly in terms of risks and average catches up to  
γ = 0.3, but above that, those which have a maximum TAC of 33,000 t result in lower catch and risk 
than the others. Setting a minimum TAC (of 7000 t) increases the chances of closing the fishery, but 
do not affect the rest of performance indicators. 
 
In the cases without TAC constrain, risks between 5 - 10% for the stock of falling below Blim 
correspond to γ =0.3, with average catch around 19,500 t. For rules with upper TAC constrain = 
33,000 t and similar associated risk the catch is around 17,200 t.  
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Figure 3.1.1.2: Performance statistics (probability of SSB falling below Blim, probability of closing the 
fishery, the average catch and average sd  in catch) depending on the harvest rate γ for Rule B 
(harvesting a constant proportion of the SSB) in the biomass model  (using BBM) with the Ricker SR 
model.. Solid, dashed, dotted and dot-dashed lines represent the case without any restriction on the 
TAC, with a maximum TAC restriction of 33,000 t, with a minimum viable TAC of 7000 t and with a 
maximum TAC restriction of 33,000 t and  a minimum viable TAC of 7000 t respectively. 
 
.  
 
For both HCRs (A and B) imposing an upper limit of 33,000 tonnes to the TAC results in lower catch 
and lower associated variability and probability of SSB being below Blim  than the case where no 
ceiling  was imposed. Setting a minimum TAC of 7,000 tonnes, to have a viable fishery, do not change 
the performance of the rules except for increasing the probabilities of closures, i.e. similar catches are 
obtained for the same harvest rates at similar risks (see Fig. 3.1.1.3).  
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Figure 3.1.1.3: Catches versus Risks for both HCR A and B according to the different TAC constraints 
 
Setting a minimum TAC level of 7,000 tonnes, to have a viable fishery, does not change the 
performance of the rules except for increasing the probabilities of closures, i.e. similar catches are 
obtained for the same harvest rates at similar risks.  
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Comparison of the performance of Rules A and B: 
 
For the same harvest rate (γ) and TAC constraints, Rule A - Harvesting with a constant proportion 
above an escapement SSB level - seems to be more precautionary in terms of implying less risks for 
the stock of falling below Blim, due to yielding lower average catches and allowing higher population 
levels than Rule B - Harvesting a constant proportion of the SSB-. 
 
Both Rules behave very similarly for a similar average expected catch, although risk appears to 
increase slightly faster in the case of rule B. (Figure 3.1.1.3). However, variability in catch reflected by 
the Standard deviation of the catch may be higher for Rule A. 
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Figure 3.1.1.4: Comparison of the Performance of the two basic harvest rules: Rule A. Harvesting a 
constant proportion above an escapement SSB level (solid line) and Rule B: harvesting a constant 
proportion of the SSB (dashed line), for the biomass model (using BBM) with the Ricker SR model 
and no minimum or maximum TAC constraint (SSB is the median SSB at the end of the period). 
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Sensitivity to the Stock Recruitment Model  
The complete performance statistics for both base Rules A and B for the biomass model according to 
the different Stock Recruitment models selected in this study can be examined in Appendix II. An 
example of the sensitivity of Harvest Control Rule A (harvesting a constant proportion above an 
escapement level) to the selected Stock Recruitment Relationship is presented in Figure 3.1.1.5 for 
illustration. 
 
The HCRs explored are not sensitive to the use of either the Ricker or the Quadratic Hockey Stick SR 
models, (just negligible increases on final SSB estimates and catches, at similar biological risk levels), 
since both fitted models are very similar (section 2.3.1.1). However, the influence of persistent low 
recruitment is major. This would lead to lower biomass and higher probabilities of SSB of falling 
below Blim and of the fishery being closed though with far lower catches than for the normal SRRs. In 
the low recruitment model catches would always be on average below 9,000t with associated risk > 
10% of falling below Blim in any year of the simulations, regardless the selected harvest rate. 
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Figure 3.1.1.5: Comparison of the Performance of the basic harvest Rule A. Harvesting a constant 
proportion above an escapement SSB level for the different Stock Recruitment Models selected for the 
analysis: Ricker and Quadratic Hockey Stick SR models and continuous Low Recruitment Levels. 
Risk is measured as the Probability of falling below Blim in any year of the 10 years of projection. 
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3.1.2. Age structured Model 
Sensitivity to the Population and Fishery Model.  
 
In this section the age structure model is reviewed and its table are updated for a longer number of 
iterations than the ones achieved for the first meeting’s report, including small corrections in the 
inputs. Hence, these are the tables of reference for the age structured model.  
The robustness of the results to the underlying population model was studied in detail by comparing 
the performance statistics resulting from the biomass model with the age-structured model (Ricker SR 
model). Tables 3.1.1.21 and 2 show the performance statistics for the age-structured model for Rules A 
and B. Complete results can be found in Tables of Appendices II and III. Note that in most cases, 
results are based on 500 simulations (see tables 3.1.1.2.1 and 2), although only 100 simulations were 
performed at the extremes of the γ range explored because of time constrains.  
 
Figures 3.1.1.2.1 and 2 compare the probability of the population of being at biological risk, the 
probability of having the fishery closed, the average catch and the variation in the catch depending on 
the harvest rate (γ parameter) for Rule A and B. The results in terms of the influence of the harvest rate 
are similar to the ones from the biomass model: the higher γ the higher the catch and the associated 
risk. In addition the role of the different TAC constrains is also similar: Above γ = 0.4 the rules start to 
diverge, those that have a maximum TAC of 33,000 t result in lower catch and risk than the others. 
Setting a minimum TAC (of 7000 t) increases the chances of closing the fishery, but on average do not 
affect the rest of performance indicators.  
 
In the age-structured model as for the Biomass based model the Harvest control Rule A results in 
lower biological risk than rule B for a given γ. Τhis is because for the same γ, the catch resulting from 
the rule A is lower and the resulting biomass is higher than for rule B.  
 
Comparing the results from the biomass model and the age-structured (see two examples in Figure 
3.1.1.2.3), the major difference is that the probability of SSB being below Blim is higher for the 
biomass model for a given harvest rate. In addition, although to a lesser extend, for the same average 
catch the associated risk is higher for the biomass model. This is because for harvest rates (γ) above 
0.5 the age-structured model results in higher biomass levels and generally, across γ, in lower catch. 
Certainly, the average catch and the standard deviation of the catch are slightly higher in the Biomass 
model.  
 
The reasons for the difference in performance between models were investigated and the conclusions 
are the following:  
• Small differences in the parameterization of the Stock and Recruitment relationship and their 
uncertainty around the curve.  As shown in section 2.1.1.3 of the first STECF report, Maximum 
Recruitment is higher (by about 10%) for the biomass model  than for the Age structured 
model. Consequently, the age structured model at zero or low harvest rates results in smaller 
spawning biomass than the biomass model. In addition Figure 6.3.1.3 of that section shows that 
the shape of the SRRs for the Age structured model is slightly more productive at lower SSB so 
that it generates higher recruitments than with the Biomass model of SRRs at low biomass 
levels. This implies a higher resilience to exploitation of the population for the age structured 
model than for the biomass model, leading to higher biomasses at higher harvest rates in this 
model. 
• Differences in the Growth and Natural Mortality balance between the two models: particularly 
the age structured model assumes different mean weight at age in the stock and in the catch.  
o Mean weight at age in the stock: As actual growth in the stock of ages 2+ is smaller 
than the one modelled by the biomass model, for the same mortality pattern surviving 
biomasses are smaller for the age structured model than for the biomass model. This 
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makes that the age structured model at null or low harvest rates results in smaller 
spawning biomass than the biomass model. At higher harvest rates the differences 
diminish because the relative contribution of biomass at old ages diminishes as well. 
And the other factors mentioned here above and below make the SSB of the age 
structured model to overtake the biomass model at higher harvest rates reducing risks. 
o Mean weight in the catch: they are higher than in the stock, therefore, a lower fishing 
mortality is required in the age-structured model than in the biomass model to take a 
given TAC. This is because the biomass model assumes implicitly that the mean weight 
at age in the catch is the same as in the stock. As a result, the age-structured model 
reaches equilibrium at higher SSBs. This is particularly noticeable when exploitation 
rate is high.  
• Fishing mortality in the age-structured model is continuous while in the biomass model catch is 
taken as a pulse three times a year. These results in lower mortality and higher survivorship for 
a given catch in the age-structured model compared to the biomass model.  
• The age-structured model uses the selectivity fishing pattern applied on a half-year basis while 
the selectivity in the biomass model is flat.  
 
The age-structured model has correct growth and selectivity inputs as measured from surveys and from 
past assessments. Although more heavily parameterised than the biomass model the model is 
defensible and provides an alternative to test sensitivity of the results to model structure. 
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Table  3.1.1.2.1: Summary results of the performance of Harvest Control Rule A. Harvesting with a 
constant proportion above an escapement SSB level for the population model (age structured model) . 
Complete results can be seen in Tables of Appendix III. Given time limitations results are based on 
100 or 500 simulations (ITERS). 
HCR Allocat SR HR ITERS TACmax TACmin
Median 
SSBlast
P(SSB<Blim)
P(SSB<Blim 
once)
P(closure)
P(closure 
once)
Average 
catch
Average sd 
catch
Rule A cte ricker 0 100 no no 80.251 0.01 0.05 1.00 1.00 0.000 0.00
Rule A cte ricker 0.1 100 no no 73.417 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.20 4.967 3.55
Rule A cte ricker 0.2 500 no no 64.844 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.26 9.187 7.05
Rule A cte ricker 0.3 500 no no 62.557 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.24 12.734 10.08
Rule A cte ricker 0.4 500 no no 56.406 0.01 0.09 0.04 0.30 15.898 13.41
Rule A cte ricker 0.5 500 no no 51.568 0.03 0.18 0.06 0.40 18.809 16.61
Rule A cte ricker 0.6 500 no no 49.099 0.04 0.29 0.07 0.50 21.038 19.02
Rule A cte ricker 0.7 500 no no 42.716 0.07 0.45 0.10 0.62 22.971 21.99
Rule A cte ricker 0.8 500 no no 42.635 0.10 0.60 0.12 0.70 24.322 24.12
Rule A cte ricker 0.9 100 no no 36.227 0.13 0.69 0.17 0.81 24.078 24.85
Rule A cte ricker 1 100 no no 39.717 0.13 0.72 0.15 0.78 27.527 27.30
Rule A cte ricker 0 100 33.000 no 78.033 0.01 0.03 1.00 1.00 0.000 0.00
Rule A cte ricker 0.1 100 33.000 no 70.613 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.15 4.744 3.51
Rule A cte ricker 0.2 500 33.000 no 65.423 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.19 9.328 6.97
Rule A cte ricker 0.3 500 33.000 no 58.751 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.24 12.911 9.21
Rule A cte ricker 0.4 500 33.000 no 56.802 0.01 0.08 0.04 0.31 15.097 10.64
Rule A cte ricker 0.5 500 33.000 no 58.877 0.02 0.15 0.05 0.36 16.930 11.18
Rule A cte ricker 0.6 500 33.000 no 52.483 0.03 0.19 0.06 0.40 18.175 11.66
Rule A cte ricker 0.7 500 33.000 no 51.390 0.04 0.29 0.07 0.47 19.041 12.06
Rule A cte ricker 0.8 500 33.000 no 48.749 0.06 0.39 0.09 0.57 19.464 12.51
Rule A cte ricker 0.9 100 33.000 no 55.733 0.08 0.50 0.10 0.59 20.269 12.51
Rule A cte ricker 1 100 33.000 no 44.580 0.07 0.41 0.11 0.67 20.076 12.78
Rule A cte ricker 0 100 no 7.000 73.770 0.01 0.05 1.00 1.00 0.000 0.00
Rule A cte ricker 0.1 100 no 7.000 70.275 0.01 0.04 0.75 1.00 2.536 4.41
Rule A cte ricker 0.2 500 no 7.000 64.465 0.00 0.01 0.45 1.00 7.941 8.38
Rule A cte ricker 0.3 500 no 7.000 61.369 0.00 0.03 0.33 0.96 12.389 11.54
Rule A cte ricker 0.4 500 no 7.000 55.851 0.01 0.06 0.29 0.96 15.518 14.35
Rule A cte ricker 0.5 500 no 7.000 53.444 0.02 0.14 0.27 0.94 18.376 17.05
Rule A cte ricker 0.6 500 no 7.000 48.047 0.03 0.25 0.27 0.93 20.212 19.57
Rule A cte ricker 0.7 500 no 7.000 46.378 0.07 0.42 0.28 0.94 22.430 22.07
Rule A cte ricker 0.8 500 no 7.000 43.606 0.09 0.57 0.29 0.95 24.137 25.00
Rule A cte ricker 0.9 100 no 7.000 37.261 0.12 0.68 0.30 0.98 25.433 27.77
Rule A cte ricker 1 100 no 7.000 38.359 0.14 0.77 0.30 0.97 26.516 28.07
Rule A cte ricker 0 100 33.000 7.000 78.722 0.01 0.05 1.00 1.00 0.000 0.00
Rule A cte ricker 0.1 100 33.000 7.000 81.797 0.00 0.02 0.70 1.00 3.216 5.03
Rule A cte ricker 0.2 500 33.000 7.000 65.636 0.00 0.03 0.45 0.99 8.019 8.36
Rule A cte ricker 0.3 500 33.000 7.000 59.215 0.00 0.04 0.33 0.97 11.914 10.26
Rule A cte ricker 0.4 500 33.000 7.000 59.775 0.01 0.05 0.28 0.92 14.478 11.46
Rule A cte ricker 0.5 500 33.000 7.000 57.456 0.01 0.11 0.25 0.92 16.232 11.95
Rule A cte ricker 0.6 500 33.000 7.000 57.101 0.02 0.18 0.23 0.87 17.887 12.50
Rule A cte ricker 0.7 500 33.000 7.000 51.585 0.04 0.27 0.22 0.87 18.762 12.68
Rule A cte ricker 0.8 500 33.000 7.000 52.586 0.04 0.30 0.22 0.88 19.627 12.93
Rule A cte ricker 0.9 100 33.000 7.000 52.461 0.05 0.33 0.21 0.84 20.449 13.06
Rule A cte ricker 1 100 33.000 7.000 50.559 0.05 0.34 0.21 0.84 20.919 12.91  
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Figure 3.1.1.2.1: Performance statistics depending on the harvest rate for Harvest Rule A. Harvesting 
with a constant proportion above an escapement SSB level, in the case using age structured population 
dynamics with the Ricker SR model. 
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Table  3.1.1.2.2: Summary results of the performance of Harvest Control Rule B. Harvesting a 
constant proportion of the SSB, for the age-structured population model . Complete results can be seen 
in Tables of Appendix III. Number of simulations is either 100 or 500 (ITERS). 
HCR Allocat SR HR ITERS TACmax TACmin
Median 
SSBlast
P(SSB<Blim)
P(SSB<Blim 
once)
P(closure)
P(closure 
once)
Average 
catch
Average sd 
catch
Rule B cte ricker 0 100 no no 79.803 0.00 0.02 1.00 1.00 0.000 0.00
Rule B cte ricker 0.1 500 no no 69.466 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.19 6.971 3.91
Rule B cte ricker 0.2 500 no no 64.117 0.01 0.09 0.03 0.25 12.585 7.66
Rule B cte ricker 0.3 500 no no 52.820 0.02 0.16 0.06 0.38 17.137 11.37
Rule B cte ricker 0.4 500 no no 47.012 0.05 0.34 0.08 0.55 20.452 14.67
Rule B cte ricker 0.5 500 no no 42.085 0.09 0.54 0.12 0.67 23.610 18.40
Rule B cte ricker 0.6 500 no no 38.945 0.14 0.70 0.16 0.78 26.208 21.66
Rule B cte ricker 0.7 100 no no 34.060 0.22 0.87 0.23 0.91 25.910 24.21
Rule B cte ricker 0.8 100 no no 29.397 0.25 0.90 0.27 0.92 26.878 26.02
Rule B cte ricker 0.9 100 no no 33.938 0.26 0.94 0.27 0.98 30.633 30.06
Rule B cte ricker 1 100 no no 28.495 0.31 0.95 0.33 0.98 31.291 32.49
Rule B cte ricker 0 100 33.000 no 71.499 0.00 0.04 1.00 1.00 0.000 0.00
Rule B cte ricker 0.1 500 33.000 no 65.908 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.21 6.655 3.79
Rule B cte ricker 0.2 500 33.000 no 64.476 0.01 0.07 0.03 0.26 12.362 7.28
Rule B cte ricker 0.3 500 33.000 no 55.441 0.03 0.18 0.06 0.41 15.899 9.57
Rule B cte ricker 0.4 500 33.000 no 53.586 0.04 0.30 0.08 0.49 19.023 11.01
Rule B cte ricker 0.5 500 33.000 no 48.554 0.08 0.46 0.11 0.60 20.471 11.85
Rule B cte ricker 0.6 500 33.000 no 45.261 0.10 0.54 0.12 0.66 21.846 12.50
Rule B cte ricker 0.7 100 33.000 no 45.219 0.13 0.69 0.15 0.77 22.094 13.24
Rule B cte ricker 0.8 100 33.000 no 47.484 0.13 0.65 0.14 0.68 23.056 13.18
Rule B cte ricker 0.9 100 33.000 no 39.139 0.17 0.71 0.17 0.74 22.940 13.65
Rule B cte ricker 1 100 33.000 no 46.344 0.14 0.73 0.17 0.81 23.683 13.71
Rule B cte ricker 0 100 no 7.000 74.378 0.01 0.04 1.00 1.00 0.000 0.00
Rule B cte ricker 0.1 500 no 7.000 72.528 0.00 0.03 0.58 1.00 4.500 5.41
Rule B cte ricker 0.2 500 no 7.000 65.727 0.01 0.05 0.20 0.84 12.181 8.44
Rule B cte ricker 0.3 500 no 7.000 58.691 0.02 0.17 0.19 0.85 16.640 12.02
Rule B cte ricker 0.4 500 no 7.000 50.263 0.05 0.32 0.20 0.85 20.173 14.85
Rule B cte ricker 0.5 500 no 7.000 44.977 0.09 0.55 0.23 0.91 23.710 18.89
Rule B cte ricker 0.6 500 no 7.000 39.408 0.14 0.69 0.27 0.94 25.246 21.75
Rule B cte ricker 0.7 100 no 7.000 36.567 0.20 0.81 0.33 0.99 25.798 25.19
Rule B cte ricker 0.8 100 no 7.000 33.064 0.23 0.91 0.34 0.99 27.547 26.72
Rule B cte ricker 0.9 100 no 7.000 27.350 0.25 0.97 0.34 1.00 30.198 29.35
Rule B cte ricker 1 100 no 7.000 26.309 0.35 0.98 0.42 1.00 27.849 30.62
Rule B cte ricker 0 100 33.000 7.000 79.582 0.00 0.03 1.00 1.00 0.000 0.00
Rule B cte ricker 0.1 500 33.000 7.000 70.927 0.00 0.02 0.58 1.00 4.520 5.50
Rule B cte ricker 0.2 500 33.000 7.000 59.634 0.01 0.07 0.22 0.86 11.525 8.06
Rule B cte ricker 0.3 500 33.000 7.000 58.534 0.02 0.15 0.18 0.79 16.347 10.16
Rule B cte ricker 0.4 500 33.000 7.000 52.590 0.05 0.32 0.20 0.83 18.472 11.55
Rule B cte ricker 0.5 500 33.000 7.000 50.533 0.07 0.42 0.20 0.85 20.584 12.37
Rule B cte ricker 0.6 500 33.000 7.000 45.558 0.10 0.55 0.22 0.89 21.362 13.04
Rule B cte ricker 0.7 100 33.000 7.000 48.827 0.11 0.61 0.20 0.80 23.291 13.01
Rule B cte ricker 0.8 100 33.000 7.000 49.928 0.12 0.62 0.22 0.88 23.076 13.69
Rule B cte ricker 0.9 100 33.000 7.000 43.554 0.15 0.69 0.23 0.85 22.919 14.03
Rule B cte ricker 1 100 33.000 7.000 36.434 0.19 0.77 0.25 0.87 22.516 14.18  
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Figure 3.1.1.2.2: Performance statistics depending on the harvest rate for Rule B. Harvesting a 
constant proportion of the SSB in the age-structured model assuming the Ricker SR model. 
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1- No TAC max & No TAC min for Rule A  
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2 TAC max = 33.000 t & TAC min = 7000 t for Rule A 
 
6704.348 0.000
4473.557 0.001
4490.340 -0.001
4985.804 -0.005
-770.132 -0.002
1244.158 -0.008
2172.487 -0.014
-984.730 -0.012
-737.801 -0.007
1291.102 -0.011 0.011 -0.105 0.067 -0.011 -0.001 -0.112 353.206 596.207
-2283.121 0.000 0.005 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2839.890 0.004 0.013 0.036 0.035 0.003 0.015 0.033 172.445 92.345
-822.716 -0.001 -0.008 -0.009 -0.017 -0.002 -0.013 -0.020 361.410 194.117
3562.420 -0.002 -0.007 -0.017 -0.014 -0.003 0.001 -0.025 232.682 54.873
4567.070 -0.003 -0.009 -0.028 -0.018 0.001 0.007 0.009 159.075 -47.661
3204.621 -0.008 -0.055 -0.083 -0.055 -0.011 -0.055 -0.109 449.096 -176.841
1186.925 -0.001 -0.014 -0.011 0.006 -0.001 -0.005 -0.011 226.489 56.296
326.843 -0.005 -0.015 -0.045 -0.030 -0.009 -0.026 -0.085 319.346 -75.268
1381.135 0.001 0.001 0.009 0.010 0.001 0.013 0.014 29.050 -112.885
-98.049 -0.006 -0.021 -0.059 -0.045 -0.006 -0.014 -0.059 225.685 -22.748
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Figure 3.1.1.2.3: Relative Performance of Rule A for the Biomass based and age structure Models 
depending on the harvest rate with the Ricker SR model for two cases: 1- Upper panels without any 
TAC constraint and 2- with maximum and minimum TAC levels.   
3.1.3. Performance of Rule C 
 
Table 3.1.3.1 summarises the performance statistics for the Harvest Control Rule C in the biomass 
model, i.e. where the population dynamics is based on the Biomass based Model and the SR model is 
Ricker, quadratic hockey stick or low. In general, for this Harvest control Rule case C as for former 
cases A & B, imposing an upper limit of 33,000 tonnes to the TAC gets smaller catches and variability 
on the catches with lower probabilities of SSB being below Blim. Setting a minimum TAC of 7,000 
tonnes in order to have a viable fishery has a similar effect, though to a lesser extend. HCR 1 is more 
or less equivalent to Harvest Control Rules A and B for γ around 0.6. 
 
As before, there are almost no differences under the Ricker and the quadratic hockey stick SR models, 
whereas the low recruitment model leads lower biomass levels with subsequent higher probabilities of 
SSB falling below Blim and of the fishery being closed, and certainly low catches.  
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Table 3.1.3.1: Performance statistics for Rule C (selected by Fishermen) in the using Biomass Based 
Mode) with different SR models.  
 
HCR Allocat SR TACmax TACmin Median SSBlast P(SSB<Blim)
P(SSB<Blim 
once) P(closure)
P(closure 
once)
Average 
catch
Average sd 
catch
Rule C cte ricker no no 41354 0.160 0.676 0.257 0.894 24240 31089
Rule C cte ricker 33000 no 53456 0.076 0.418 0.164 0.741 18586 12376
Rule C cte ricker no 7000 40920 0.164 0.667 0.398 0.984 24145 31691
Rule C cte ricker 33000 7000 52095 0.063 0.363 0.279 0.922 18471 12873
Rule C cte qhstk no no 39992 0.167 0.672 0.258 0.896 23755 29981
Rule C cte qhstk 33000 no 53692 0.071 0.382 0.157 0.714 18708 12355
Rule C cte qhstk no 7000 42098 0.143 0.610 0.379 0.980 25292 32124
Rule C cte qhstk 33000 7000 53954 0.065 0.367 0.272 0.892 18858 12626
Rule C cte low no no 25907 0.255 0.903 0.517 0.999 3533 5429
Rule C cte low 33000 no 25778 0.254 0.920 0.517 1.000 3519 5336
Rule C cte low no 7000 26892 0.240 0.873 0.786 1.000 2843 5570
Rule C cte low 33000 7000 26369 0.225 0.872 0.776 1.000 2945 5718
Rule C var ricker no no 38423 0.169 0.702 0.264 0.904 23450 30079
Rule C var ricker 33000 no 53563 0.075 0.398 0.159 0.714 18418 12191
Rule C var ricker no 7000 42540 0.157 0.658 0.397 0.989 23684 30418
Rule C var ricker 33000 7000 55220 0.070 0.364 0.274 0.917 18629 12950
Rule C var qhstk no no 41660 0.167 0.671 0.254 0.880 24510 30556
Rule C var qhstk 33000 no 53276 0.077 0.408 0.164 0.722 18604 12187
Rule C var qhstk no 7000 42881 0.154 0.627 0.396 0.982 23873 30746
Rule C var qhstk 33000 7000 54539 0.067 0.356 0.274 0.898 18761 12749
Rule C var low no no 25202 0.269 0.922 0.527 1.000 3515 5448
Rule C var low 33000 no 26134 0.266 0.905 0.526 1.000 3486 5401
Rule C var low no 7000 26753 0.230 0.867 0.783 1.000 2918 5771
Rule C var low 33000 7000 26816 0.233 0.861 0.781 1.000 2912 5699  
 
When comparing the results from the biomass based with the age structured model (Table 3.1.3.2), the 
probability of SSB being below Blim, the probability of having the fishery closed, the average catch and 
the standard deviation of the catch are larger for the biomass based. The major underlying differences 
of both models are the SR model, and therefore the productivity of the stock, and the fishing selectivity 
pattern. 
 
Table 3.1.3.2: Performance statistics for Rule C using an age-structured model with the Ricker SR 
model 
 
 
HCR Allocat SR TACmax TACmin
Median 
SSBlast
P(SSB<Blim)
P(SSB<Blim 
once)
P(closure)
P(closure 
once)
Average 
catch
Average sd 
catch
Rule C cte ricker no no 51.620 0.056 0.360 0.183 0.890 22.354 23.287
Rule C cte ricker 33000 no 49.804 0.032 0.220 0.148 0.760 17.044 12.853
Rule C cte ricker no 7000 44.515 0.064 0.440 0.349 0.990 21.093 24.082
Rule C cte ricker 33000 7000 48.559 0.033 0.240 0.316 0.980 16.961 13.582  
 
 
3.2. Economic Analysis  
In this section the economic analysis of the different management alternatives have been performed. 
The economic model presented in the previous section was run for all the management alternatives and 
the results were analysed in terms of some indicators. These indicators take into account the following: 
• Prices by year  
• Discounted gross revenue obtained from anchovy and overall by year. 
• Discounted Cash flow by fleet and overall by year. 
• Probability of negative cash flow for each fleet by year. 
• Comparison between the mean wage by country and the estimated wage by FTE by year. 
All these results are available but, given the number of cases tested, their presentation is limited to 
summary graphs which provide the evolution of selected indicators along the different harvest rates (γ, 
gamma). 
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The selected indicators are: 
• The overall discounted gross revenue obtained from the anchovy (1000€). 
• The overall and by fleet discounted cash flow (1000€). 
• The probability of negative cash flow (%). 
• The social indicator (relative to 1) 
Given that Rules A and B perform similarly it is not necessary to repeat all the analysis for both rules. 
The economic model has been coded for this specific economic evaluation. Furthermore, the model 
was validated by gradually introducing uncertainty. 
3.2.1. Model validation  
The model has been run in a stochastic way. It is ready for introducing uncertainty in almost all the 
estimated parameters, but the limited time has only allowed introducing some uncertainty: biological 
uncertainty and, economic uncertainty. The last one was introduced by adding a random effect to the 
production function of “other” species rather than anchovy. 
Hence the full analysis has been performed using sequentially a deterministic model, including 
biological uncertainty, and finally adding uncertainty on the production function of other species. 
The validation of the model has been done for both rules (A and B) but in this section only results for 
Rule A will be presented. 
3.2.1.1. The deterministic model 
The deterministic model has been run using the median of the biomass as well as the median of the 
TAC for each harvest rate. Following that only one price for each half of the year is calculated using 
its median value. Also, the production function for anchovy is calculated once for each half of the year 
and fleet using the median of the biomass distribution. 
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Figure 3.2.1.1.1: Harvest rate and discounted gross revenue obtained from anchovy using constant 
allocation and a deterministic model. 
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Results from the biological model show how options with a maximum TAC of 33,000 tonnes (cases b 
and d) give average maximum catch values of around 2,0000 tonnes while cases a and c (without this 
maximum) give maximum catch values around 24,000-25,000.  
As we have shown in the price function section, income increases with the TAC up to 32,000 tonnes 
(although this value depends on the allocation that we are assuming) which suggests that the best 
harvest rate should be the one which allows higher catches (a and c). However, in those cases the 
discounting is affecting the results. 
Options with a maximum TAC of 33000 tonnes (cases b and d) attain their maximum value at harvest 
rates γ = 1 while those without this maximum attain their maximum values between 0.5 and 0.8. Given 
that in all cases the highest catches are attained with the highest harvest rate (or almost), implicitly we 
are considering that it is not the mean catch attained which counts but also the evolution of the catch in 
the projections period. 
3.2.1.2. Incorporating biological uncertainty 
When the biological uncertainty is incorporated prices and catchabilities for the production function of 
anchovy are calculated 1,000 times (using all the iterations provided in the biomass models). Results 
shown correspond to median values. 
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Figure 3.2.1.2.1: Harvest rate and discounted Gross revenue obtained from anchovy using constant 
allocation and including biological uncertainty. 
 
As it can be seen maximum gross revenue are obtained at the same harvest rates. However, in the case 
where no maximum TAC is incorporated (cases a  and c) there could be some iterations were the TAC 
was above the observed range of catches used for estimating the price function. Therefore, these 
findings should be interpreted with caution. 
The uncertainty provides the possibility of calculating the number of times that the overall cash flow is 
negative. That is, the risk of a negative overall cash flow, which is shown in the following graphs. 
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Figure 3.2.1.2.2: Harvest rate and Economic risk obtained using constant allocation for the three fleets. 
 
 
3.2.1.3. Incorporating uncertainty on the production function of “others” 
 
We have also run the model with a coefficient of variance for the parameter k (catchability of “other” 
species) of 25% for all fleets and half year. The reason for doing so is the importance that the 
production function of the rest of the species has on the performance of the fleets. In the simulations, 
we are assuming that the “other” species are always available to the anchovy fleet which may not 
necessarily be the case. 
In terms of the gross revenue obtained from the anchovy there are no significant differences as a result 
of adding uncertainty in k. This is because we are always assuming that the total catch is going to be 
caught by the fleets. However, in terms of the probability of having a negative cash flow there are 
some interesting differences. Results are shown below: 
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Figure 3.2.1.3.1: Harvest rate and Economic risk obtained using constant allocation for the three fleets 
and uncertainty on the production function of “other” species 
 
The incorporation of the uncertainty in k results in a reduction the probability of negative cash flow. 
The reason for that is that now the availability (in terms of catchability) of “other” species is variable 
and not constant. 
In all cases above, and for all the fleets, the risks of having a negative cash flow decreases substantially 
when applying the HCR with an upper TAC of 33,000t 
3.2.1.4. Some other considerations to validate the model. 
As stated before there are some other uncertainties both in the model and in the parameters used for the 
simulation that were not taken into account. Prices, and costs parameters as well as the production 
functions for anchovy are under some degree of uncertainty but the group chose not to incorporate 
them given the short time to perform the analysis and hence to validate the results. 
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3.2.2. Economic evaluation of the HCR A 
 
Simulations were run for all the possibilities. Rule A and B, the four TAC constraints (a, b, c and d), 
all the harvest rates (from 0.1 to 1) and for different allocation possibilities (Constant allocation, 
variable allocation, 90% (Spain)-10% (France), 80% (Spain)-20% (France) , 70% (Spain)-30% 
(France) and 60% (Spain)-40% (France). 
Given that Rules A and B perform similarly only Rule A is going to be shown, and also only for 
constant and variable allocation, for the case when biological as well as uncertainty in the production 
function of other species is taken into account. Results for the two rules and for different allocations 
are shown on tables in Appendix IV. 
3.2.2.1. Constant allocation 
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Figure 3.2.2.1.1.: Harvest rate and discounted Gross revenue obtained from anchovy using constant 
allocation. 
 
For the constant allocation, discounted income increases with the harvest rate except for the cases 
where a maximum TAC is not considered. In these two last cases there could be some iterations where 
that TAC is high enough to reduce the price in such a way that there is not worthy in terms of income 
to increase the harvest rate. This result should be considered carefully given that the price function has 
been estimated with observed catches below the range of the extreme values of some of the iterations 
considered6.  
                                                 
6 In any case the deterministic runs also have showed this result, (while the median is within the 
range of estimation of the price function). 
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For intermediate and high harvest rates it seems that the rules with a maximum TAC of 33,000 t result 
in higher discounted gross revenues. 
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Rule A: Gamma and Discounted Cash Flow relationship. Allocation: Constant
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Rule A: Gamma and Discounted Cash Flow relationship: Spain. Allocation: Constant
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Figure 3.2.2.1.2: Discounted Cash flow (overall and by fleet) and harvest rate relationship using 
constant allocation. 
 
Cash flow is showing results quite opposite to the gross revenue. The lowest the harvest rate (γ) the 
higher the cash flow obtained. This result is due to the opportunities that the model is providing for 
fishing some other species, which makes more profitable to fish small amounts of anchovy since it 
implies a higher price and then fish the other species whose price was assumed constant. Further 
developments of the model should try to avoid this effect. A more in depth analysis of the production 
function would be helpful. 
Note that the reduction of cash flow at increasing harvest rate is less steep when a TAC maximum is 
imposed. 
Probability of negative Cash flow per fleet 
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Figure 3.2.2.1.3: Economic risk (overall and by fleet) and harvest rate relationship using constant 
allocation. 
 
The probability of having a negative cash flow was computed as the number of iterations (in 
percentage) which results in a negative cash flow. Again, note there are significant differences in 
associated risk between the cases where a maximum TAC is imposed and where it is not; the risk 
being lower where there is a maximum.  
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Social indicators per fleet 
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Rule A: Gamma and Social Indicator relationship: FRench Purse seiners.. Allocation: Constant
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Rule A: Gamma and Social Indicator relationship: Spain. Allocation: Constant
 
Figure 3.2.2.1.4: Social indicator by fleet and harvest rate relationship using constant allocation. 
 
Purse seiners of both member stated face values around 1 for the whole sequence of harvest rate, 
which is remarkable given that there are vessels of different size and with different share systems. In 
any case the assumptions made: constant number of vessels, constant FTE and constant costs are 
clearly affecting these results.  
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3.2.2.2. Variable allocation 
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Figure 3.2.2.2.1: Harvest rate and discounted Gross revenue obtained from anchovy using variable 
allocation. 
 
In the case of variable allocation the results in terms of gross revenue, optimum harvest rates and 
overall values are similar to the constant allocation. Differences are not significant. 
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Cash flow per fleet 
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Rule A: Gamma and Discounted Cash Flow relationship. Allocation: Variable
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Figure 3.2.2.2.2: Discounted Cash flow (overall and by fleet) and harvest rate relationship using 
variable allocation. 
 
When the Cash flow is considered, in overall terms the results are the same as when constant allocation 
is used, but now the French fleets would prefer higher harvest rates to compensate the lower quota that 
are receiving. 
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Figure 3.2.2.2.3: Economic risk (overall and by fleet) and harvest rate relationship using variable 
allocation. 
 
The probability of negative cash flow is just slightly higher but follows the same pattern as the 
constant allocation. 
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Figure 3.2.2.2.4: Social indicator by fleet and harvest rate relationship using variable allocation. 
 
In overall terms the social indicator is slightly worse for French pelagic trawlers and slightly better for 
the Spanish purse seiners. The structure is similar to the constant allocation. 
 
3.2.2.3. Other allocation methods 
 
As commented before some other allocation methods were also tested. Specifically, the one based on 
the relative stability principle (i.e. 90% to Spain and 10% to France), and intermediate options: 80-20, 
70-30 and 60-40. Results show how the probability of negative cash flow are overall reduced for Spain 
and increased for France. But given the effect of other species these changes are not dramatic. Results 
for these allocations are shown in the tables at the end of this section. 
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4. Conclusions 
4.1. Biological Model 
• The higher the exploitation rate the higher the catch, its variability and associated risk. 
• Setting a maximum TAC reduces maximum attainable catch and decreases inter-annual 
variability in TACs (Fig.3.1.1.1 & 2). For a given harvest rate an upper TAC of 33,000 t 
reduces catches, their variability and the associated risks. 
• Setting a minimum TAC does not alter mean catch or associated risk but increases the 
probability of closures. 
• For the same risk level, expected catches are higher for the options where there is no upper 
TAC constraint (Fig.3.1.1.3).  
• Both rules A & B imply similar risk at equal mean annual catch (fig.3.1.1.4). However, Rule B 
may result in higher stability in TACs. 
• Results are not sensitive to the use of either the Ricker or the Quadratic Hockey stick stock and 
recruitment models.  
• However there is high sensitivity to a low recruitment scenario. If a low recruitment scenario 
persisted then catches would be on average less than 10,000 t while the associated risk will be 
higher than 10% for all harvest strategies investigated. 
• Two population models were implemented to test the HCR. The biomass model that forms the 
basis for ICES advice was implemented as the base case.  
• There is uncertainty in the estimation of associated risk for each harvest rate, depending on the 
population and fishery model used. For the same harvest rate, the age-structured model 
estimates lower risk and catch. For the same expected catch, the age-structured model suggests 
lower risk.  
• The difference in estimated risk between models may suggest a need for some flexibility in its 
interpretation. Levels of less than 5% are normally considered precautionary. However, given 
the uncertainty in the estimates of risk, harvest rates resulting in risk slightly higher than 5% 
according to the biomass model should be advanced for consideration.  
4.2. Economic Model: main findings 
• Overall discounted gross revenue is maximized when the harvest rate is increased. This is 
clearly so when a maximum TAC of 33.000 tonnes is set. This maximum TAC allows a better 
overall result compared to the cases where there is not such maximum. 
• The highest overall discounted cash flow is maximized for low harvest rates but this could be a 
consequence of the “optimistic” expected availability of other species and that the price for 
them was kept constant. This “optimistic” way of doing the analysis is especially important for 
Spain given that it has not been possible to estimate a production function for other species by 
half year, which results in the alternatives in the first half year being over estimated. 
• The highest overall discounted cash flow decreases with the harvest rate, but this decrease is 
more flat when a maximum TAC of 33000 tonnes is applied (cases b and d). 
• The economic risk is much lower when a maximum TAC of 33000 tonnes is applied (cases b 
and d), and also the increase of risk is more flat in these two cases. 
• The social indicator reflects the relationship between the average wage of the member state and 
those obtained by the fleets. Given that the number of vessels has been considered fixed, it only 
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reflects the social consequences in this scenario. If the number of vessels changes, the social 
consequences may also be different. 
• Social consequences are not taking into consideration employment other than employment as 
crew on-board. Employment directly or indirectly linked to the fishing activity was not taken 
into account. 
• Deterministic and stochastic runs perform similarly in terms of income, even if the price 
function may apply to values outside the observed range of TAC used for its estimation. This is 
especially true when there is no maximum TAC.  
• Cost parameters as well as the production function for anchovy and other species were 
estimated, but further work should be done in this basis to refine the estimations. 
• Evolution of cost is a key factor in the economic performance of the fleets, but even if in the 
simulations we have tried to use the last available data, they have remained constant for 
simulation purposes. 
• There are factors which could not be considered in this analysis but are likely to have a great 
influence in the economic performance of the HCR. The anchovy processing industry (which 
represents the most important demand for these fleets) could change their purchasing patterns 
as they have done while the fishery was closed, changing dramatically the price function 
structure. 
• This industry is asking for a well supplied market (high TAC) and low prices. In that sense low 
TACs create a risk to the fleets of loosing their buyers. But high TACs also increase the risk of 
closing the fishery, and discontinuity in the supply could also result in the processing industry 
turning to other markets. 
• The effect of the allocation method of TAC into quota by countries on the national fleets was 
tested. Obviously the higher the allocation to Spain the lower the probability of negative cash 
flow for Spain and the higher for France. However, given the effect of switching to other 
species these changes may have a lesser impact than a priori suspected.  
 
4.3. Limitations and scope for the application of the analysis performed by 
this STECF WG on Long-term management of anchovy 
The validity of the results presented in the current report depends on the availability of the necessary 
data to fit the models and the validity of the assumptions made to complete the simulations and the 
analysis of the report. New information leading to reviewing inputs and assumptions would require 
revisiting the conclusions presented in the current report. The major relevant factors underpinning the 
validity of this report are listed below: 
• The Biological modeling of the population is valid as far as the productivity of the stock does 
not change and remains well reflected in the stock recruitment relationships used for the 
simulations. The simulations and conclusions presented in this report should only be 
considered valid as long as the S/R parameters do not significantly vary in future from the ones 
used in this document. In case significant changes of the stock productivity took place, then the 
analysis presented in this report should be re-evaluated before using it again as basis for advice 
on the management of anchovy.  
• The HCR are based on estimates of the absolute levels of biomass of the population and the 
reference points for management. If those change, then the Harvest control rules should be 
accordingly revised or reformulated, although in relative terms the impact on the long term 
expected catches is likely to be minimal.  
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• There is no interaction between the biological and the economic model (economic models are 
not included in the MSE loop). This would mean that fishing takes place irrespective of the 
economic performance between anchovy and other species.  
• Total fishing effort is linked to the number of vessels which is fixed 
• Economic data sets, especially DCR data, were available to the WG and for the the relevant 
fleet segments and this was considered as positive for the WG. However some data were 
missing such as capital cost, interest cost (for both fleets) and net profit indicator was not 
calculated. More detailed information on earnings, costs and employment per metier was not 
available for economic assessment. The lack of longer time series for the estimation of demand 
functions and production functions was also considered as a limitation. 
• The economic and social impact has been restricted to the impact on the fleets. The impact 
associated to consumer’s (processing industry, etc) and to in land employment through 
spillover effects has not been taken into account. The inclusion of the associated work in terms 
of consumer’s welfare indicator would presumably tend to favor rules resulting in high catch 
(not necessarily the highest cash flow of the fleet). In any case the inclusion of these indicators 
may change substantially the assessed impacts of any harvest control rule.  
• The harvest control rules tested assume that no recruitment index is available in autumn, before 
recruits of age 1 enter the fishery at the beginning of the year. Therefore the management 
calendar goes from July to June next year, based on the SSB estimates provided by the direct 
surveys in May. The likelihood that a recruitment index becomes available and operative in the 
next coming years is high. In that case the current analysis of potential HCRs should be 
expanded to include a recruitment index that would potentially help to improve the 
management of the stock. The recruitment index should be available for the formulation of 
management advice at the beginning of the year, leading to a management calendar from 
January to January with a revision (if necessary) at the middle of the year according to the 
spring direct surveys. A complete revision of the performance of these and other HCRs would 
be required in this new scenario for management. 
• Other assumptions limiting the analysis: no assessment bias is taken into account although 
retrospective analyses suggest that the bias in the assessment is not significant (Fig 3, 
Appendix I).  The set TAC is assumed caught (there are no implementation errors).  
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6. Appendix I: Response to STECF Spring Plenary  
 
After the presentation of the main findings from the first meeting on Long-term management plan for 
Bay of Biscay anchovy the STECF Plenary made two suggestions. The response of the STECF WG 
follows. 
 
1) 
 
“…in the HCRs which have been investigated by the WG, the TAC is set on the basis of the SSB at the 
start of the fishing season (1 July) and without prior knowledge of the size of the incoming year class 
(age 1, 1 January) which constitutes a major part of the catch in the spring (2nd half of the TAC year).  
STECF highlights that this could cause problems of a mismatch between TAC and catch rates if a 
large year-class were to occur following the implementation of a low TAC.  STECF suggests that the 
WG should investigate the likelihood of this occurring. Time permitting, the likelihood of a high TAC 
when the stock is low would also be investigated.” 
  
In order to study the likelihood of mismatches between the set TAC and the TAC that would 
correspond to the actual stock level (optimal TAC), the distribution of the TAC difference (set TAC 
minus TAC optimal) have been analysed. Figures 1 and 2 show the median, 90% and 95% confidence 
intervals for the TAC difference  in the first half year for Rule B case a (when there are no constrains 
on the TAC) and case d (when a maximum TAC of 33,000 tonnes and a minimum TAC of 7,000 
tonnes are imposed) respectively. The larger the exploitation rateγ , the larger the TAC differences 
will be. The median TAC difference is zero, indicating that it is equally likely to have a set TAC larger 
than the optimal TAC than to have a lower set TAC. When no upper or lower TAC constrain is set the 
distribution of the TAC difference is symmetric around zero. However, when upper and lower 
constrains are established the distribution is not symmetric. Tables 1-4 summarize the probabilities of 
the TAC difference depending on the harvest rate for Rule B and cases a-d (no constrain, upper bound, 
lower bound, upper and lower bound) respectively.      
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Figure 1: The median (solid line), 90% (dashed line) and 95% (dotted line) confidence intervals of 
TAC difference in the 1st half year depending on the harvest rate γ for Rule B case a (when there are no 
constrains on the TAC). 
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Figure 2: The median (solid line), 90% (dashed line) and 95% (dotted line) confidence intervals of 
TAC difference in the 1st half year depending on the harvest rate γ for Rule B case d (when a 
maximum TAC of 33,000 tonnes and a minimum TAC of 7,000 tonnes are imposed). 
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Table 1: Probability distribution for the difference in the 1st half year between the TAC and the TAC 
that would have been set in case the real SSB would have been known without any error depending on 
the harvest rate for Rule B case a (no constrains). 
 
 
TAC - TACopt 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Less than -20,000 0.009 0.049 0.097 0.139 0.169 0.191 0.209 0.230 0.243 0.242
Between -20,000 and -15,000 0.013 0.031 0.044 0.051 0.047 0.054 0.054 0.051 0.042 0.045
Between -15,000 and -10,000 0.032 0.065 0.071 0.076 0.077 0.072 0.071 0.061 0.057 0.053
Between -10,000 and -5,000 0.098 0.128 0.125 0.111 0.105 0.095 0.083 0.077 0.068 0.068
Between -5,000 and 0 0.389 0.269 0.196 0.157 0.131 0.112 0.100 0.083 0.081 0.070
0 0.010 0.013 0.014 0.019 0.038 0.052 0.076 0.103 0.132 0.170
Between 0 and 5,000 0.329 0.220 0.156 0.130 0.113 0.094 0.076 0.071 0.064 0.051
Between 5,000 and 10,000 0.082 0.107 0.106 0.090 0.076 0.071 0.065 0.055 0.045 0.042
Between 10,000 and 15,000 0.024 0.054 0.064 0.065 0.061 0.052 0.050 0.045 0.037 0.033
Between 15,000 and 20,000 0.008 0.027 0.040 0.045 0.039 0.040 0.039 0.037 0.033 0.027
More than 20,000 0.007 0.037 0.086 0.116 0.146 0.167 0.177 0.188 0.198 0.199
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Table 2: Probability distribution for the difference in the 1st half of the year between the TAC and the 
TAC that would have been set in case the real SSB would have been known without any error 
depending on the harvest rate for Rule B case b (upper limit 33,000t). 
 
 
TAC - TACopt 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Less than -20,000 0.013 0.041 0.069 0.090 0.102 0.112 0.129 0.135 0.138 0.149
Between -20,000 and -15,000 0.013 0.037 0.052 0.058 0.059 0.061 0.055 0.054 0.051 0.050
Between -15,000 and -10,000 0.030 0.059 0.080 0.082 0.082 0.081 0.074 0.070 0.068 0.063
Between -10,000 and -5,000 0.095 0.134 0.130 0.122 0.107 0.094 0.087 0.082 0.074 0.071
Between -5,000 and 0 0.390 0.262 0.194 0.156 0.141 0.112 0.101 0.089 0.080 0.072
0 0.011 0.013 0.039 0.073 0.122 0.166 0.211 0.235 0.275 0.291
Between 0 and 5,000 0.323 0.227 0.167 0.142 0.119 0.102 0.088 0.080 0.071 0.068
Between 5,000 and 10,000 0.086 0.118 0.116 0.102 0.094 0.089 0.074 0.073 0.065 0.058
Between 10,000 and 15,000 0.024 0.062 0.075 0.080 0.071 0.070 0.062 0.059 0.051 0.051
Between 15,000 and 20,000 0.011 0.034 0.049 0.052 0.051 0.052 0.050 0.047 0.045 0.042
More than 20,000 0.004 0.013 0.029 0.044 0.054 0.062 0.069 0.076 0.082 0.087
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Table 3: Probability distribution for the difference in the 1st half of the year between the TAC and the 
TAC that would have been set in case the real SSB would have been known without any error 
depending on the harvest rate for Rule B case c (lower limit 7,000t). 
 
 
TAC - TACopt 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Less than -20,000 0.017 0.057 0.109 0.153 0.187 0.208 0.226 0.233 0.247 0.250
Between -20,000 and -15,000 0.021 0.043 0.057 0.055 0.056 0.056 0.053 0.051 0.047 0.044
Between -15,000 and -10,000 0.059 0.088 0.090 0.087 0.080 0.073 0.071 0.064 0.057 0.057
Between -10,000 and -5,000 0.097 0.105 0.100 0.091 0.086 0.069 0.059 0.055 0.055 0.045
Between -5,000 and 0 0.043 0.081 0.076 0.064 0.057 0.046 0.035 0.035 0.027 0.025
0 0.501 0.260 0.166 0.152 0.140 0.163 0.180 0.198 0.222 0.254
Between 0 and 5,000 0.057 0.094 0.080 0.064 0.055 0.047 0.041 0.035 0.027 0.021
Between 5,000 and 10,000 0.111 0.109 0.100 0.082 0.067 0.060 0.052 0.046 0.041 0.031
Between 10,000 and 15,000 0.063 0.081 0.080 0.075 0.066 0.056 0.055 0.045 0.042 0.039
Between 15,000 and 20,000 0.020 0.038 0.053 0.050 0.047 0.043 0.042 0.039 0.036 0.033
More than 20,000 0.010 0.045 0.090 0.128 0.158 0.179 0.187 0.199 0.200 0.203
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Table 4: Probability distribution for the difference in the 1st half of the year between the TAC and the 
TAC that would have been set in case the real SSB would have been known without any error 
depending on the harvest rate for Rule B case d (upper limit 33,000t and lower limit 7,000t). 
 
TAC - TACopt 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Less than -20,000 0.017 0.053 0.079 0.103 0.115 0.126 0.139 0.147 0.152 0.159
Between -20,000 and -15,000 0.020 0.047 0.061 0.066 0.069 0.064 0.063 0.057 0.054 0.053
Between -15,000 and -10,000 0.060 0.089 0.095 0.092 0.087 0.077 0.069 0.071 0.061 0.058
Between -10,000 and -5,000 0.097 0.113 0.102 0.100 0.085 0.080 0.072 0.065 0.055 0.054
Between -5,000 and 0 0.047 0.083 0.076 0.066 0.059 0.051 0.051 0.042 0.040 0.037
0 0.496 0.246 0.199 0.194 0.221 0.265 0.278 0.310 0.343 0.360
Between 0 and 5,000 0.058 0.096 0.092 0.089 0.079 0.065 0.059 0.053 0.048 0.039
Between 5,000 and 10,000 0.115 0.117 0.110 0.097 0.084 0.077 0.075 0.061 0.051 0.049
Between 10,000 and 15,000 0.066 0.090 0.093 0.089 0.080 0.068 0.064 0.062 0.058 0.051
Between 15,000 and 20,000 0.018 0.046 0.054 0.056 0.057 0.055 0.051 0.048 0.050 0.046
More than 20,000 0.006 0.022 0.039 0.050 0.064 0.072 0.080 0.085 0.087 0.094
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2) 
 
“As a general comment to the simulations tests of the HCR, STECF repeats its previous advice that the 
assessment model used in the HCR simulations should be the same as the assessment model that is 
used to derive the management advice. In addition, the WG verified the results from the biomass 
operating model by using an age-structured model. STECF notes that for the case of Bay of Biscay 
anchovy, the model currently used to provide advice to managers is a Bayesian model, which prevents 
its use in the HCR simulations because of too great a computational burden for the time available to 
the group. STECF suggests that one way to simulate the dependencies between the HCR simulation 
results and the Bayesian assessment accuracy, would be for the WG to use the estimates of bias from 
previous Bayesian stock assessments. STECF suggests that given autocorrelation in the residuals in 
the biomass assessment that is taken into account in the simulations.” 
  
The Bay of Biscay anchovy stock is assessed by a Bayesian biomass-based model (BBM) 
implemented using Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods. Given the computational burden 
needed to run the assessment, the assessment has not been included in the management strategy 
evaluation (MSE) loop. Instead, the assessment error has been included together with the observation 
error from the surveys. The observed SSB, which is used to set the TAC, has been taken as a log-
normal distribution with mean given by the true population SSB and a constant CV of 25%. This 
implies that the observed SSB, is assumed to be unbiased. In order to analyse to which extend this 
assumption may be too strong a retrospective analysis was conducted for the BBM. Figure 3 shows the 
medians (solid lines) of the retrospective SSB time-series for the years 1987 to 2007. The red bullets 
correspond to the median SSB in the assessment year. The 95% credible intervals (dashed lines) 
correspond to the 2007 SSB estimates. In general there is no bias in the assessment except in 2000. 
This year the SSB estimates from the DEPM and the acoustic surveys were very different from each 
other. Since the BBM takes the DEPM as absolute the assessment favoured the DEPM SSB estimate, 
which was proved to be biased by the following year surveys and landings.  
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Figure 3: Retrospective analysis for the BBM. Solid lines represent the SSB medians for each annual 
assessment. The red solid circles are the SSB median from the last year of each annual assessment. 
The dashed lines represent the 95% credible intervals for the assessment in 2007.   
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7. Appendix II: Summary results of the evaluation of the proposed HCRs using the biomass based model 
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8.  Appendix III  
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9. Appendix IV. Economic analysis: performance of the two basic HCRs 
for different quota allocation schemes. 
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